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METR

Update on Security at METR Brief independent investigation of agents’ behavior, reasoning and collaboration in the OpenAI / Hugging Face hacking incident 对 OpenAI / Hugging Face 入侵事件中智能体行为、推理与协作的简要独立调查 Breve investigación independiente sobre el comportamiento, el razonamiento y la colaboración de los agentes en el incidente de hackeo de OpenAI / Hugging Face Have We Seen an Acceleration in Discoveries? Funding update How independent researchers could investigate AI propensities after misalignment incidents Metrics of Agent Ability The Economics of Recursive Self-Improvement Expenditure Horizon: Measuring Optimization Ability, with an Application to NanoGPT Because 8 ≈ e², Anthropic's researcher uplift is plausibly >2x Summary of METR's predeployment evaluation of GPT-5.6 Sol Frontier AI Safety Policies Frontier Risk Report (February to March 2026) 前沿 AI 风险报告(2026 年 2–3 月) Informe de riesgos de la IA de frontera (febrero–marzo de 2026) Measuring the Self-Reported Impact of Early-2026 AI on Technical Worker Productivity Task Substitution and Uplift Review of the "Risks from automated R&D" section in the Anthropic Risk Report (February 2026) Evidence on AI R&D Progress from NanoGPT MirrorCode: Evidence that AI can already do some weeks-long coding tasks Fine-tuning experiments on CoT controllability Red-Teaming Anthropic's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems Impact of modelling assumptions on time horizon results We spent 2 hours working in the future Review of the Anthropic Sabotage Risk Report: Claude Opus 4.6 Many SWE-bench-Passing PRs Would Not Be Merged into Main Observations from two CLI game reimplementation runs with Opus 4.6 We are Changing our Developer Productivity Experiment Design Five lessons from having helped run an AI-Biology RCT
How We Protect Confidential Information
METR · 2026-02-18 · via METR

METR works with AI developers, governments, and other research organizations who sometimes provide nonpublic model access and proprietary information. Over time, we’ve developed confidentiality and security measures to protect such access and information. This post describes our approach at a high level.

Confidentiality measures

Our confidentiality policy, setup, and norms primarily address the risk of leaks during conversation and in infrastructure, though they also reduce insider threat risk by limiting who knows what.

Policy

Our confidentiality policy assigns information—including (but not limited to) nonpublic access, lab relationships, policy work, and funding—to our six confidentiality levels, ranging from public to internally siloed, based on sensitivity. At the most restricted end, information about nonpublic models (including capabilities, evaluation timelines, and which developer we’re working with) is limited to researchers directly involved and discussed only by codename. Our own methodology, tasks, and infrastructure are available more broadly within METR, and much of this work is eventually published.

Our policy also provides standard responses for sensitive questions, guidance on edge cases, quick rules of thumb with examples and FAQs, and possible slip-ups to watch out for.

Flagging easy places to slip up:

  • Sensitive information in calendar event names (visible on room booking displays)
  • Confirming we don't have access to something (which reveals information by exclusion)
  • Inadequate soundproofing for sensitive discussions
  • Forecasting on public prediction markets about topics we may have inside knowledge of
  • [...]
Paraphrased excerpt from our confidentiality policy's section on easy places to slip up

As part of our onboarding process we conduct 1-1 confidentiality training that includes live mock questioning to practice responding to sensitive questions in realistic settings. We also conduct background and reference checks during hiring.

Setup

These six confidentiality levels are used as prefixes across Slack, documents, and other platforms, so confidentiality expectations are visible without relying on memory. Technical controls prevent accidental sharing; for example, documents can’t be shared externally without explicit marking, and channel membership is centrally managed. Even within METR, we do project-specific siloing for sensitive technical and policy projects. For example, to preserve confidentiality around nonpublic model access:

  • Only researchers involved in a model’s evaluation can generate and see the model’s completions.
  • When a lab gives us access to a non-public model, we generate an animal codename (e.g. “playful-panda”), and all discussion and references to the model within METR use this codename.
  • Although our agents are public and our analysis pipeline code is accessible to core team members, for each evaluation we create a secret fork of these repos only accessible by people working on the evaluation.

These steps help prevent inadvertent leaks and limit exposure if our infrastructure were compromised.

Norms

Our confidentiality setup enforces some constraints, but we maintain additional norms to reduce the risk of slips in conversation. For example:

  • We use codenames (like “playful-panda”) for all nonpublic model access even in conversations where both parties know the identity, and we default to saying “[playful-panda] lab” rather than using the developer name.
  • We actively recognize people for handling confidentiality carefully and encourage staff to flag potential lapses in a dedicated Slack channel.
  • We maintain a log of slips and near-misses and do retros for them.

Security measures

The table below summarizes our main security controls that protect against breaches and help limit damage from insider threats. These measures, alongside others, contributed to our SOC 2 Type I certification.

IAM
  • A central identity provider permits only FIDO2 authentication.
  • Access to most services is further restricted to logins from preapproved devices.
  • Model access is protected by layered access controls: our VPN requires SSO authentication to reach internal infrastructure, API endpoints are scoped within private VPCs, and our internal proxy enforces per-request token-based authorization.
  • Within our evaluation platform, access controls ensure researchers can only view transcripts from models they are authorized to access.
  • Dedicated admin accounts are enrolled in Google’s Advanced Protection Program.
Endpoints
  • Mobile device management (MDM) enforces security measures and automatic updates on METR computers.
  • An application allowlist restricts what can run on METR computers.
  • Access to METR systems requires using a dedicated Chrome profile, so we can enforce an extension allowlist and additional hardening.
  • For certain sensitive materials, Google Workspace's client-side encryption ensures content is decrypted only on authorized endpoints.
Monitoring & Response
  • Logs from most platforms are streamed to a SIEM, where default and custom detection rules monitor for indicators of account compromise, unauthorized data access, and anomalous endpoint behavior.
  • Automated workflows help handle alerting and response, like requesting confirmation of new logins, scanning binaries, and escalating alerts that remain unresolved for ≥12 hours.
Governance & Assurance
  • External cybersecurity experts provide ongoing feedback on our security posture, and we conduct security testing and audits at least annually.
  • Periodic access reviews backstop standard provisioning and deprovisioning, though the latter handle the vast majority of changes.

For questions about our measures, contact security@metr.org.

The measures described above are accurate as of February 17, 2026 and are subject to change.