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METR

Because 8 ≈ e², Anthropic's researcher uplift is plausibly >2x Summary of METR's predeployment evaluation of GPT-5.6 Sol Frontier AI Safety Policies Frontier Risk Report (February to March 2026) 前沿 AI 风险报告(2026 年 2–3 月) Informe de riesgos de la IA de frontera (febrero–marzo de 2026) Measuring the Self-Reported Impact of Early-2026 AI on Technical Worker Productivity Task Substitution and Uplift Review of the "Risks from automated R&D" section in the Anthropic Risk Report (February 2026) Evidence on AI R&D Progress from NanoGPT MirrorCode: Evidence that AI can already do some weeks-long coding tasks Fine-tuning experiments on CoT controllability Red-Teaming Anthropic's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems Impact of modelling assumptions on time horizon results We spent 2 hours working in the future Review of the Anthropic Sabotage Risk Report: Claude Opus 4.6 Many SWE-bench-Passing PRs Would Not Be Merged into Main Observations from two CLI game reimplementation runs with Opus 4.6 Five lessons from having helped run an AI-Biology RCT How We Protect Confidential Information Analyzing coding agent transcripts to upper bound productivity gains from AI agents Measuring Time Horizon using Claude Code and Codex A simpler AI timelines model predicts 99% AI R&D automation in ~2032 Frontier AI safety regulations: A reference for lab staff 前沿 AI 安全法规:AI 公司员工参考指南 Regulación de seguridad de IA de frontera: una referencia para el personal de laboratorios Time Horizon 1.1 Clarifying limitations of time horizon Early work on monitorability evaluations Common Elements of Frontier AI Safety Policies (December 2025 Update) Details about METR's evaluation of OpenAI GPT-5.1-Codex-Max Review of the Anthropic Summer 2025 Pilot Sabotage Risk Report Summary of our gpt-oss methodology review MALT: A Dataset of Natural and Prompted Behaviors That Threaten Eval Integrity Early Results on Monitorability in QA Settings Claude, GPT, and Gemini All Struggle to Evade Monitors Forecasting the Impacts of AI R&D Acceleration: Results of a Pilot Study Research Update: Algorithmic vs. Holistic Evaluation Notes on Scientific Communication at METR CoT May Be Highly Informative Despite “Unfaithfulness” Details about METR's evaluation of OpenAI GPT-5 How Does Time Horizon Vary Across Domains? Measuring the Impact of Early-2025 AI on Experienced Open-Source Developer Productivity What should companies share about risks from frontier AI models? Details about METR's preliminary evaluation of DeepSeek and Qwen models Recent Frontier Models Are Reward Hacking Details about METR's preliminary evaluation of OpenAI's o3 and o4-mini Details about METR's preliminary evaluation of Claude 3.7 HCAST: Human-Calibrated Autonomy Software Tasks Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Tasks Response to OSTP on AI Action Plan Why it’s good for AI reasoning to be legible and faithful 为什么 AI 推理应当可读,并如实反映模型的实际决策过程 Por qué conviene que el razonamiento de la IA sea comprensible y fiel Details about METR's preliminary evaluation of DeepSeek-R1 METR’s GPT-4.5 pre-deployment evaluations Measuring Automated Kernel Engineering Details about METR's preliminary evaluation of DeepSeek-V3 An update on our preliminary evaluations of Claude 3.5 Sonnet and o1 AI models can be dangerous before public deployment Evaluating frontier AI R&D capabilities of language model agents against human experts The Rogue Replication Threat Model Response to Bureau of Industry and Security’s proposed AI reporting requirements New Support Through The Audacious Project Details about METR's preliminary evaluation of OpenAI o1-preview Response to U.S. AISI Draft “Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models” Vivaria Details about METR's preliminary evaluation of GPT-4o An update on our general capability evaluations Response to NIST Draft Generative AI Profile ML Engineers Needed for New AI R&D Evals Project Emma Abele is METR’s new Executive Director Autonomy Evaluation Resources Example autonomy evaluation protocol Guidelines for capability elicitation Measuring the impact of post-training enhancements GitHub - METR/public-tasks Portable Evaluation Tasks via the METR Task Standard 2023 Year In Review Bounty: Diverse hard tasks for LLM agents ARC Evals is now METR Responsible Scaling Policies (RSPs) 负责任扩展政策(RSP) Políticas de escalamiento responsable (RSP) ARC Evals is spinning out from ARC New report: Evaluating Language-Model Agents on Realistic Autonomous Tasks Response to RfC on AI Accountability Policy Update on ARC's recent eval efforts
We are Changing our Developer Productivity Experiment Design
METR · 2026-02-24 · via METR

METR previously published a paper which found the use of AI tools caused a 20% slowdown in completing tasks among experienced open-source developers, using data from February to June 2025.

To understand how AI is impacting developer productivity over time, we started a new experiment in August 2025 with a larger pool of developers using the latest AI tools.

Unfortunately, given participant feedback and surveys, we believe that the data from our new experiment gives us an unreliable signal of the current productivity effect of AI tools. The primary reason is that we have observed a significant increase in developers choosing not to participate in the study because they do not wish to work without AI, which likely biases downwards our estimate of AI-assisted speedup. We additionally believe there have been selection effects due to a lower pay rate (we reduced the pay from $150/hr to $50/hr), and that our measurements of time-spent on each task are unreliable for the fraction of developers who use multiple AI agents concurrently.

Based on conversations with study participants, we believe it is likely that developers are more sped up from AI tools now — in early 2026 — compared to our estimates from early 2025. However, because of the selection effects in our experiment, our data is only very weak evidence for the size of this increase.

Our raw results show some evidence for speedup. Our early 2025 study found the use of AI causes tasks to take 19% longer, with a confidence interval between +2% and +39%. For the subset of the original developers who participated in the later study, we now estimate a speedup of -18% with a confidence interval between -38% and +9%. Among newly-recruited developers the estimated speedup is -4%, with a confidence interval between -15% and +9%.

Late-2025 AI likely accelerated open-source developers, but selection effects obscure the true speedup.

However the true speedup could be much higher among the developers and tasks which are selected out of the experiment. Some developers self-report very high speedups, though as we documented in our earlier study those estimates can be quite unreliable.

Due to the severity of these selection effects, we are working on changes to the design of our study. Below, we provide further detail and describe our plans for other means of studying the impact of AI on developer productivity.

Wider adoption of AI has made it more difficult to measure task-level productivity

Our second study, starting in August, consisted of 10 developers from the original study, plus a new set of 47 developers recruited from a more diverse set of open-source projects. The participants were paid $50/hour for their participation.

As in the initial study, developers were asked to pre-specify each task that they intended to work on, and then submit the task-description for randomization. Each task was assigned to an “AI allowed” or “AI disallowed” condition. The developers would record the amount of time it took to complete the task, and we could thus compare the average time required to complete a typical task with and without AI.

Throughout 2025 there was an increase in the use of agentic tools among open-source developers, such as Claude Code and Codex. This wider adoption of AI has had two important effects in our study:

  1. Recruitment and retention of developers has become more difficult. An increased share of developers say they would not want to do 50% of their work without AI, even though our study pays them $50/hour to work on tasks of their own choosing. Our study is thus systematically missing developers who have the most optimistic expectations about AI’s value.

  2. Developers have become more selective in which tasks they submit. When surveyed, 30% to 50% of developers told us that they were choosing not to submit some tasks because they did not want to do them without AI. This implies we are systematically missing tasks which have high expected uplift from AI.

Together, these effects make it likely that our estimate reported above is a lower-bound on the true productivity effects of AI on these developers. The selection effects seem to affect a minority share of developers and of tasks, which limits the degree of bias. However we are likely missing data on the most active adopters of AI, who may be of most interest. As AI capabilities continue to increase and developers’ expectations grow as well, these effects will only get more dramatic, further limiting the validity of this study design.

Based on our interviews and surveys we believe the increase in selection is primarily due to higher expectation of AI-driven uplift by our developers. However the second study also had a lower pay rate, $50/hour instead of $150/hour in the original study, and this also likely contributed to the higher selection.

We also noticed some other problems, though we judged the magnitude of these to be less severe:

  1. Some developers told us the types of tasks they attempted were different with agentic AI, leaning on the strengths of AI. This has two effects (a) the task-selection will be different between those in our study and those outside it; (b) the time-differences within the study may not represent value-differences, due to the substitution in task-type.

  2. Some developers told us the quality of the final work, for a given task, was different between AI-allowed and AI-disallowed conditions, e.g. differences in subjective code quality, or the amount of documentation or tests they chose to create.

  3. Some developers were less likely to complete tasks that they submitted if they were assigned to the AI-disallowed condition. One developer did not complete any of the tasks that were assigned to the AI-disallowed condition.

  4. Some developers reported it was challenging to report time-spent in completing tasks when they used agentic tools, because they would often work an unrelated task while waiting for the agent to complete its work.

Altogether, these issues make it challenging to interpret our central estimate, and we believe it is likely a bad proxy for the real productivity impact of AI tools on these developers.

Selected developer quotes

“I’m torn. I’d like to help provide updated data on this question but also I really like using AI!” — a developer from the original study early-2025 when asked to participate in the late-2025 study.

“I found I am actually heavily biased sampling the issues … I avoid issues like AI can finish things in just 2 hours, but I have to spend 20 hours. I will feel so painful if the task is decided as AI-disallowed.” — a developer from the new study noting selection effects when choosing what tasks to include in the study.

“my head’s going to explode if I try to do too much the old fashioned way because it’s like trying to get across the city walking when all of a sudden I was more used to taking an Uber.” — a developer from the new study noting selection effects when choosing what tasks to include in the study.

Other means of measuring productivity

The impact of AI tools on developer productivity is an important input to AI R&D acceleration, and so we plan to continue exploring the following lines of research:

  1. More intensive experiments. The selection issues would be alleviated if we had higher compliance, which could be achieved if we run shorter intense experiments, and possibly pay higher rates.

  2. Observational data. There are many rich data sources on AI use in software development – from aggregate statistics (e.g. approximately 4% of GitHub commits are authored by Claude Code) to fine-grained transcripts (e.g. Sarkar (2025)). We intend to continue observation of our pool of open-source developers to understand how AI is used.

  3. Questionnaires. Despite the difficulty of interpreting self-reported productivity counterfactuals, and thus their potential biases, we are optimistic that careful choice of survey questions, along with time-use studies, could produce useful signals.

  4. Fixed-task experiments. Our original study was novel in letting developers choose their own tasks, before randomization was applied. We could revert to a simpler design in which developers are given a fixed task to complete, either with or without AI assistance.

  5. Evaluations. METR is continuing to build task evals, to measure the ability of agents to autonomously complete tasks, which has a clear relevance to productivity effects of agent adoption.

  6. Developer-level experiments. An alternative design is to randomize at the developer level instead of the task level, i.e. each participant either uses AI for all their tasks or for none. This alleviates some of the task-level selection problems, however it makes the developer-level selection problems worse, and has lower power in detecting productivity effects.

As model capabilities continue to increase, we expect to continue to need to redesign some portions of our capability and measurement techniques.

Details of the productivity study

We paid developers $50/hour to work on their existing open-source projects, randomizing issues into working with AI-allowed or AI-disallowed. Developers were experienced open-source contributors with median 10 years experience. We have data from 57 developers, across 143 repos, and 800+ tasks.

10 of these developers are from the original study, and the remaining developers are new and recruited from a more diverse set of repositories—including smaller, more greenfield, and less mature repositories.

The full dataset from the early study is available here, and the most recent study here.