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Homepage on Aditya Telange

One Year with evil-winrm-py - A Retrospective Bypassing LinkedIn's Connection Privacy with a Simple Search Filter Making Dynamic Instrumentation Accessible with Frida UI Breaking Payload Encryption in Web Applications HackTheBox (HTB) - Escape HackTheBox (HTB) - Resolute HackTheBox (HTB) - Certified State of VMWare Workstation (Pro?) on Linux Android App Security Testing Lab with MobSleuth Android phone as a Webcam on Linux Breaking down Reverse shell commands HackTheBox (HTB) - Photobomb Merging AOSP Security Patches into Custom ROMs Primer on HTTP Security Headers Image Zoom-In effect with HUGO HackTheBox (HTB) - Legacy HackTheBox (HTB) - Lame Cryptohack - Keyed Permutations [5 pts] Cryptohack - Resisting Bruteforce [10 pts] Cryptohack - RSA Starter 1 [10 pts] Cryptohack - Base64 [10 pts] Cryptohack - Bytes and Big Integers [10 pts] Cryptohack - Hex [5 pts] Cryptohack- XOR Starter [10 pts] HackTheBox (HTB) - Horizontall HackTheBox (HTB) - Forge HackTheBox (HTB) - Previse HackTheBox (HTB) - BountyHunter HackTheBox (HTB) - Explore HackTheBox (HTB) - Cap HackTheBox (HTB) - Pit HackTheBox (HTB) - Knife HackTheBox (HTB) - Love HackTheBox (HTB) - Tenet HackTheBox (HTB) - Ready Watermarking images with HUGO My Github Project went viral! Cryptohack - ASCII [5 pts] Cryptohack - Finding Flags [2 pts] Cryptohack - Great Snakes [3 pts] Cryptohack - Network Attacks [5 pts] Cryptohack - Token Appreciation [5 pts] CAF's Android for MSM Basic Website Analytics with Vercel Github Actions as Temporary File Sharing Platform Addition of prebuilt APK - AOSP Rom Development External Link With target='_blank' in Hugo Markdown Setting Up Build Environment - AOSP Rom Development Getting Started - AOSP Rom Development Using Secure HTTP Headers with Vercel/Zeit Education and Certifications Link Tree ↟ | Aditya Telange Personal Projects Resume - Aditya Telange Security Acknowledgements About Me Graph View License Privacy Policy
Cryptohack - JWT Sessions [10 pts]
[Aditya Telange](https://x.com/adityatelange) · 2021-02-03 · via Homepage on Aditya Telange

The Solution is shared considering CAN I SHARE MY SOLUTIONS?

Problem

The traditional way to store sessions is with session ID cookies. After you login to a website, a session object is created for you on the backend (the server), and your browser (the client) is given a cookie which identifies that object. As you make requests to the site, your browser automatically sends the session ID cookie to the backend server, which uses that ID to find your session in its own memory and thus authorise you to perform actions.

JWTs work differently. After you login, the server sends your web browser the whole session object in a JWT, containing a payload of key-value pairs describing your username, privileges, and other info. Also included is a signature created using the server’s secret key, designed to prevent you from tampering with the payload. Your web browser saves the token into local storage.

On subsequent requests, your browser sends the token to the backend server. The server verifies the signature first, and then reads the token payload to authorise you.

To summarise, with session ID cookies, sessions live on the server, but with JWTs, sessions live on the client.

The main advantage of JWTs over session ID cookies is that they are easy to scale. Organisations need a way to share sessions across multiple backend servers. When a client switches from using one server or resource to another, that client’s session should still work. Furthermore, for large orgs there could be millions of sessions. Since JWTs live on the client, they solve these problems: any backend server can authorise a user just by checking the signature on the token and reading the data inside.

Unfortunately there are some downsides to JWTs, as they are often configured in an insecure way, and clients are free to modify them and see if the server will still verify them. We’ll look at these exploits in the next challenges. For now, the flag is the name of the HTTP header used by the browser to send JWTs to the server.

Solution

FLAG := authorization