We give a natural problem over input quantum oracles $U$ which cannot be solved with exponentially many black-box queries to $U$ and $U^\dagger$, but which can be solved with constant many queries to $U$ and $U^*$, or $U$ and $U^{\mathrm{T}}$. We also demonstrate a quantum commitment scheme that is secure against adversaries that query only $U$ and $U^\dagger$, but is insecure if the adversary can query $U^*$. These results show that conjugate and transpose queries do give more power to quantum algorithms, lending credence to the idea put forth by Zhandry that cryptographic primitives should prove security against these forms of queries. Our key lemma is that any circuit using $q$ forward and inverse queries to a state preparation unitary for a state $σ$ can be simulated to $\varepsilon$ error with $n = \mathcal{O}(q^2/\varepsilon)$ copies of $σ$. Consequently, for decision tasks, algorithms using (forward and inverse) state preparation queries only ever perform quadratically better than sample access. We also identify a motif, which we call the "acorn trick", where generically strengthening a quantum resource can be possible if the output is allowed to be random, bypassing no-go theorems for deterministic algorithms. We demonstrate this idea for several settings, including controlization and purification.