Byzantine agreement is a fundamental problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing that has been studied intensively for the last four decades. Much of the research has focused on a static Byzantine adversary, where the adversary is constrained to choose the Byzantine nodes in advance of the protocol's execution. This work focuses on the harder case of an adaptive Byzantine adversary that can choose the Byzantine nodes \emph{adaptively} based on the protocol's execution. While efficient $O(\log n)$-round protocols ($n$ is the total number of nodes) are known for the static adversary (Goldwasser, Pavlov, and Vaikuntanathan, FOCS 2006) tolerating up to $t < n/(3+ε)$ Byzantine nodes, $Ω(t/\sqrt{n \log n})$ rounds is a well-known lower bound for adaptive adversary [Bar-Joseph and Ben-Or, PODC 1998]. The best-known protocol for adaptive adversary runs in $O(t/\log n)$ rounds [Chor and Coan, IEEE Trans. Soft. Engg., 1985]. This work presents a synchronous randomized Byzantine agreement protocol under an adaptive adversary that improves over previous results. Our protocol works under the powerful \emph{adaptive rushing adversary in the full information model}. That is, we assume that the Byzantine nodes can behave arbitrarily and maliciously, have knowledge about the entire state of the network at every round, including random choices made by all the nodes up to and including the current round, have unlimited computational power, and may collude among themselves. Furthermore, the adversary can \emph{adaptively} corrupt up to $t < n/3$ nodes based on the protocol's execution. We present a simple randomized Byzantine agreement protocol that runs in $O(\min\{t^2\log n/n, t/\log n\})$ rounds that improves over the long-standing bound of $O(t/\log n)$ rounds due to Chor and Coan [IEEE Trans. Soft. Engg., 1985].