The threat of reconstruction attacks has led the U.S. Census Bureau (USCB) to replace in the Decennial Census 2020 the traditional statistical disclosure limitation based on rank swapping with one based on differential privacy (DP), leading to substantial accuracy loss of released statistics. Yet, it has been argued that, if many different reconstructions are compatible with the released statistics, most of them do not correspond to actual original data, which protects against respondent reidentification. Recently, a new attack has been proposed, which incorporates the confidence that a reconstructed record was in the original data. The alleged risk of disclosure entailed by such confidence-ranked reconstruction has renewed the interest of the USCB to use DP-based solutions. To forestall a potential accuracy loss in future releases, we show that the proposed reconstruction is neither effective as a reconstruction method nor conducive to disclosure as claimed by its authors. Specifically, we report empirical results showing the proposed ranking cannot guide reidentification or attribute disclosure attacks, and hence fails to warrant the utility sacrifice entailed by the use of DP to release census statistical data.