Many jailbreak attack research papers report attack success rates for a limited number of parameter settings, even though there are many combinations of parameter settings that could be used. Further, when new jailbreak papers are released, they often benchmark results against single configurations of existing attacks. This position paper argues such practices are fundamentally insufficient for characterising the threat posed by parameterised jailbreak attacks, and comparing attacks. Most jailbreak attacks expose multiple internal parameters, system prompt templates, conversation rounds, cipher dispersion, teaching shots, and ASR varies substantially across these parameters. Reporting only the best-case configuration discards two pieces of information that defenders genuinely need: how typical that performance is across the variant space, and how much of the attack surface is missed by selecting a single variant. We propose two new measures for jailbreak attacks: the Variant Sensitivity Measure (VSM) and Union Coverage (UC). VSM quantifies how far the best reported ASR deviates from the mean ASR across the tested variant space, UC is the total fraction of prompts resulting in unsafe responses across all tested configurations. We empirically demonstrate the importance of these measures using two attack families across three open-source target models. For PAIR, the best template reaches 69% ASR on Mistral-7B and 75% on Qwen3-0.6B, while UC rises to 88% and 93%, respectively. For bijection on Mistral-7B, the best variant reaches 81% ASR, but the 36-variant union covers 100% of HarmBench-100 prompts. We argue that distributional reporting, publishing VSM alongside ASR and enumerating variant coverage as fully as compute allows, should become the new minimum standard for parameterised jailbreak evaluation.