For each axiom of KM belief update we provide a corresponding axiom in a modal logic containing three modal operators: a unimodal belief operator $B$, a bimodal conditional operator $>$ and the unimodal necessity operator $\square$. We then compare the resulting logic to the similar logic obtained from converting the AGM axioms of belief revision into modal axioms and show that the latter contains the former. Denoting the latter by $\mathcal L_{AGM}$ and the former by $\mathcal L_{KM}$ we show that every axiom of $\mathcal L_{KM}$ is a theorem of $\mathcal L_{AGM}$. Thus AGM belief revision can be seen as a special case of KM belief update. For the strong version of KM belief update we show that the difference between $\mathcal L_{KM}$ and $\mathcal L_{AGM}$ can be narrowed down to a single axiom, which deals exclusively with unsurprising information, that is, with formulas that were not initially disbelieved.