Vijay’s films are predictable. The hero wins against all odds. The villain or villains, no matter how powerful, lose. Generously peppered with racy action sequences, punch dialogues, catchy songs, and item numbers, a Vijay film ticks all the boxes required for a hit, and he has been one of the most bankable actors in Tamil cinema. If a person who has lived only on highbrow cinema sees a Vijay film for the first time, they are likely to be bewildered. Looking at the hero beating a dozen, a hundred, or even a thousand bad guys single-handedly, they may ask “How is this possible?” That is the same question many a political analyst and commentator has asked after Vijay’s Tamizhaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) emerged as the single largest party in the recently concluded Tamil Nadu Assembly election.
Vijay did something that India’s most powerful leaders from Indira Gandhi to Narendra Modi tried but were unable to—rattle both the DMK and the AIADMK at the same time. As C. Joseph Vijay took oath as Chief Minister, for the first time in almost six decades, a party without the term “Dravidian” in its name comes to rule the State. But how far away TVK and Vijay are from the Dravidian ideology remains to be seen, for soon after taking office, Vijay visited the Dravidar Kazhagam president K. Veeramani at Periyar Thidal in Chennai, and paid his respects to Periyar E.V. Ramasamy, the key leader of the Dravidian Movement.
There is an interesting combination of Ministers in Vijay’s cabinet. Adhav Arjuna, TVK’s progressive face, moved from DMK to VCK before joining the TVK and is extremely adept in the language of social justice. In contrast, there is C.T.R. Nirmal Kumar who, when he was in the BJP, ran into controversy for his insensitive remarks on the Hathras Dalit rape victim. K.A. Sengottaiyan, a former AIADMK Minister, brings along with him a powerful Gounder group from the Kongu region. Rajmohan Arumugam, a popular standup comedian, is a Scheduled Caste Minister while S. Keerthana is the TVK’s youngest Minister. Diverse actors, veteran politicians, and novices appear to have come together to give the TVK its stunning entry.
Vijay’s political image got its biggest fillip from social media publicity which, like all social media content, was not entirely authentic. For instance, fake magazine covers predicting the TVK’s victory were published during the campaign. Later, some ostensibly pro-Dalit handles claimed that the TVK had fielded a large number of SC candidates in general constituencies. It was later found that it had fielded only one SC candidate from a general seat, who lost. The lone SC candidate to win from a general constituency was the Congress party’s P. Viswanathan. The DMK and AIADMK fielded none. The NTK’s record was the best, with seven to eight such candidates but they all lost. In the reserved constituencies, the TVK did well, winning 23 of 44 seats. But as for changing the order of things, that did not happen.
Then there is the figure of Vijay himself. It is said that he hails from a Vellalar-Mudaliar background, but his caste has always been underplayed. Like the mass heroes before him, MGR and Rajinikanth, Vijay’s fan base cuts across caste and religion. Where fan clubs in Andhra Pradesh of the big stars often function as de facto caste associations, in Tamil Nadu they are often a multi-caste (mostly masculine) space. Fan clubs, especially in towns and semi-rural areas, provide space for socialisation and male-bonding. For those with adequate star power, they provide associations that can be converted to voting blocs. Vijayakanth was able to do it with limited success. Rajinikanth aimed for the same but backed out. Vijay succeeded where his predecessors failed.
A new phenomenon
As tempting as it may be to analogise between Vijay and MGR or Vijayakanth, one must note that Vijay is a new, and perhaps more complicated, phenomenon. MGR was not just a film star but also a seasoned politician when he floated the ADMK. Likewise, MGR capitalised on a strong anti-DMK sentiment, as well as forces within the party who were opposed to the leadership of Karunanidhi. The Congress, which had lost strength with the rise of the DMK, assumed that supporting MGR would allow them to re-enter Tamil Nadu’s politics. But MGR’s AIADMK swallowed the Congress support base and created the duopoly that Tamil Nadu has now been accustomed to for decades.
Academics writing on Dravidian politics have usually not acknowledged that it was the AIADMK that suppressed all potential alternatives to the DMK. Under MGR, neither the Left nor the Congress could grow. His government also acted against left-wing extremism, eliminating it before it could become a threat in the State. Later, Jayalalithaa hampered the growth of Vaiko’s Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and also Vijayakanth’s Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam. It was after Jayalalithaa’s demise that AIADMK became a divided house, with other players wanting to, and succeeding in, eating into their base. The main contenders for this space were the Hindu nationalist BJP and the Tamil nativist Naam Tamilar Katchi.
Vijay, however, has frustrated all their ambitions. The TVK not only defeated the two Dravidian parties, but also greatly reduced the vote share of the BJP and the NTK. It is worth noting here that only the BJP and the NTK have any openly declared ideological opposition to Dravidianism. Vijay, on the other hand, has claimed the legacy of Periyar but not clearly verbalised any ideology. One of his first appointments was his astrologer as Officer on Special Duty, which was revoked the next day after strong criticism. Periyar stood as fiercely against irrationality and superstition as he did against caste.
Where political conflicts like Democrat or Republican, Israel or Palestine, Woke or anti-Woke, have divided friends in other places, in Tamil Nadu the leading binary of recent times was between two film stars, Ajith and Vijay. This binary saw far more polarisation than those that came before, be it MGR-Sivaji or Rajni-Kamal, and has led to violent incidents in schools, college campuses, movie theatres, and online spaces. To the fans of these two stars, every film release of their heroes was an occasion to compete with the other and show who was better. When I was a student at Loyola College, I have not seen any debate on a political or social issue that led friends to come to blows like the Ajith vs Vijay argument did.
More importantly, however, these two stars were brought into the everyday lives of Tamil people through the channels run by the two Dravidian parties and were viewed on the television sets the two parties supplied free to people as part of their populist schemes. History is replete with actions having unintended consequences. Earlier scholars have noted how Kalki’s famous historical novel Ponniyin Selvan was used by leaders of the DMK to bolster their pro-Tamil language movement against the Congress, even though Kalki himself was a Congress supporter. Now, in 2026, it was the star who was ubiquitous on Sun TV and Jaya TV (both party vehicles) who defeated the DMK and the AIADMK.
Many convincing post-facto explanations are being found. About how social media war rooms worked with Instagram reels and algorithms to amplify reach. How controlling tweets has become as important to politics as controlling the streets. Content creators have become more important than public speakers. If, as A.R. Venkatachalapathy observed, the emerging new leader of his times, C.N. Annadurai, knew how to use the microphone most effectively, a new type of politician has to master new technologies and forms of communication.
The traditional politicians that Tamil Nadu was accustomed to, an able administrator like M.K. Stalin, a strongman like Edappadi Palaniswami, or a powerful demagogue like Seeman have all been left stunned by the Vijay blitzkrieg. Vijay’s star power, TVK’s social media activity, and the party’s social composition need more in-depth study, with innovative theoretical paradigms. But as far as social justice politics, welfare measures, and State autonomy goes, the TVK at the moment appears to be a Gen Z version of the DMK and the AIADMK combined.
‘People’s mandate’
At this point, it is worth considering a term that was frequently, and often carelessly, used after the election delivered a hung assembly—“people’s mandate”. Praveen Chakravarty of the Congress said in a recent interview to News Minute that the Congress aligned with Vijay since the TVK, as the single largest party, had the people’s mandate. When cornered about the 2018 Karnataka election, where the BJP was the single largest party but the Congress aligned with the Janata Dal (Secular) (JDS) to form government, Chakravarty fumbled. That some factions of the Congress in Tamil Nadu were unhappy with the DMK is a known secret, and soon after the formation of the TVK there were demands that the party shift its alliance. That they finally did it in so abrupt and brazen a manner, with the party’s leaders not even making a courtesy call on Stalin, an ally of many years, has been called out widely, including by Congress leaders such as Mani Shankar Aiyar. The neglect was especially grating given that Stalin gave a free hand to his former allies to join the new government.
While politics, of course, is not primarily about ethics but rather about winning, the term “people’s mandate” is definitely not an ethical concept and cannot be used in the manner that Chakravarty and others have. People’s mandate, like Rousseau’s idea of General Will, is an assumption that is ultimately subservient to real numbers. In a first-past-the-post system, the assumption is that the party with the majority seats has the people’s mandate. The party with the minority seats concedes that it does not have it. When the majority is absolute, the assumption is not challenged (though we see Mamata Banerjee challenging it in West Bengal for different reasons).
But a single-largest party, without the required seats to form an Assembly, cannot automatically be assumed to have the people’s mandate. Where the party with the absolute majority has to be assumed as representing the whole, the relative majority poses difficulties. The 49 number has power, if and only if the 51 is and remains in fragments. If 51 unites, the 49 is no longer a majority, and can no longer claim mandate.
Just as it was possible for the Congress-JDS coalition to “steal the victory” from the BJP in Karnataka in 2018, or for the BJP to “steal the victory” in Goa in 2017 when the Congress was the single largest party, it was possible for all non-TVK parties to coalesce to form a government and claim to have the people’s mandate, until the units split. The possibility was rumoured but did not materialise. Similarly, the assumption of the people’s mandate being with the current government in Tamil Nadu exists only as long as the coalition lasts.
This is what differentiates an election, where multiple issues are at stake, from a referendum, which is single-issue based. The 2026 election was not a referendum on Dravidianism or secularism or on Stalin, Vijay, or Palaniswami. The voter who voted for the TVK could have done so for a variety of reasons—because TVK’s candidate was from their community, because they were Vijay fans, because their children asked them to vote for him, because they liked Vijay’s promises, because they were tired of the DMK or the AIADMK, or something else. They could be Hegelians who see in Vijay the hero of this moment in world history or simply people who love his dancing.
Vijay has won a momentous victory, yes. And, as they say in Hindi, “Jo jeeta wohi sikandar” (Whoever wins is Alexander). But a king who needs too many kingmakers wears a crown of thorns.
Karthick Ram Manoharan is the Smuts Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge.
This article has been edited and updated after initial publication for facts and clarity.
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