Editor’s note: Moses Becker is a special political commentator for News.Az. He holds a PhD in political science and specialises in inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of News.Az.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Canada from 28 to 30 May may at first appear to be a routine item on the diplomatic calendar. China’s top diplomat is taking part in a UN Security Council meeting in New York, holding talks with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and several foreign ministers, and then continuing on to Canada. Yet behind this seemingly standard sequence of events lies a much more significant story: Beijing is attempting to restore its relationship with Ottawa after several years of cold distance, trade disputes, and political mistrust.

For China, the Canadian track matters more today than it may seem at first glance. Canada is not the United States, but it is part of the Western political and economic system. It is a G7 member, a close US ally, and a major supplier of food, raw materials, energy products, and critical minerals. For Beijing, restoring dialogue with Ottawa is therefore not only about bilateral diplomacy. It is also a way to demonstrate that China’s relations with the West are not limited to confrontation with Washington and Brussels.

The problem, however, is that Canada is no longer the same partner China once dealt with. After the 2018 crisis, when Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou was detained in Vancouver, relations between the two countries entered one of the most difficult periods in their history. What began as a diplomatic dispute quickly evolved into a broader confrontation involving trade restrictions, mutual accusations, security concerns, and a profound shift in how China is perceived within Canada.

Source: Global Times

Today, for Ottawa, China is not only a vast market. It is also a partner, a competitor, and a source of strategic risk. Canadian policymakers increasingly discuss cybersecurity, foreign interference, dependence on Chinese supply chains, the protection of critical infrastructure, and technological sovereignty. This means that any attempt to improve ties with Beijing will be viewed not only as an economic move, but also as a political risk.

Still, economics cannot simply be removed from the relationship. China remains one of Canada’s largest trading partners. In 2025, trade between the two countries reached around 124 billion Canadian dollars, rising by nearly 5% compared with the previous year. Even more importantly, Canadian exports to China grew faster than imports from China. For Ottawa, this means one simple thing: the Chinese market still matters greatly to Canadian producers.

This is particularly visible in agriculture. Canola has long been one of the symbols of China–Canada trade — and one of the most painful points of tension. For Canadian farmers, China is a market worth billions of dollars. When Beijing imposes restrictions or raises tariffs, the impact is immediately felt in rural regions, among exporters, and across Canada’s domestic political agenda.

The trade disputes of recent years have shown how vulnerable these ties have become. China imposed steep duties on Canadian agricultural and seafood products, including canola-related goods, peas, pork, and seafood. Canada, in turn, moved against Chinese electric vehicles, steel, and aluminium. As a result, the dispute is no longer about individual products. It has become part of a broader struggle over markets, technology, supply chains, and industrial development.

Beijing’s renewed activity on the Canadian track has several motivations. First, China wants to reduce trade pressure on its companies. Chinese electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, and industrial goods are facing increasing barriers across Western markets. Second, Beijing needs stable channels for food, raw materials, and energy resources. Third, China wants to demonstrate that even in today’s tense international environment, it can still reach practical arrangements with Western countries.

But in Canada, these arguments are treated with caution. Ottawa does not want to open its market too widely to China’s industrial power while its own manufacturers are coming under pressure. This is especially true in the fields of electric vehicles and green technologies. China already holds strong positions in batteries, solar panels, and the broader clean-energy supply chain. Canada, meanwhile, is trying to establish its own position in critical minerals, batteries, and clean technologies.

Here, the interests of the two sides overlap but do not fully align. Canada is rich in resources and wants to export not only raw materials, but also higher-value products. China, meanwhile, wants to preserve its industrial advantages and secure access to resources. So even if the political climate improves, economic competition will not disappear.

Critical minerals are another key issue. In the economy of the future, they are becoming what oil was in the 20th century. Lithium, nickel, cobalt, rare earth elements, and other materials are essential for electric vehicles, batteries, clean energy, and defence technologies. Canada wants to strengthen its role in this field. China already occupies key positions in processing and manufacturing final products. This means that talks over minerals will be not merely commercial, but strategic.

Another limiting factor is the United States. Canada cannot shape its China policy in isolation from Washington. Its economy, security, and foreign policy are too closely tied to the United States. Any visible warming between Ottawa and Beijing will inevitably be viewed through the lens of US–China rivalry. China would likely prefer to demonstrate that the Western camp is not united in its approach to Beijing. But Canada will not risk its relationship with Washington for the sake of a rapid rapprochement with China.

This is why Wang Yi’s visit should not be viewed as the beginning of a grand reset. It is more likely an attempt to test where space for pragmatic dialogue still exists. Beijing wants to end the cold Canadian pause, but Ottawa is no longer prepared to separate trade from security as easily as before. Canada will engage with China, but it will do so far more cautiously than in the past.

Source: iStock

The success of this stage may be modest: the restoration of regular consultations, a lower risk of new tariff wars, and discussions on agricultural exports, electric vehicles, minerals, and trade rules. For business, even that would be an important signal. In international politics, predictability can sometimes matter as much as major agreements.

For Canadian farmers, the key issue will remain access to the Chinese market. For Chinese companies, it will be the reduction of barriers in Western markets. For politicians, the challenge will be to find a formula in which trade is not entirely undermined by security concerns. But finding such a formula will be difficult. Too much mistrust has accumulated, and the global environment has changed too profoundly.

That is why the current moment is important not because China and Canada are supposedly returning to their previous relationship. That relationship is gone. What matters is something else: both sides appear to understand that a complete rupture would be too costly. China does not want to lose Canada as a resource-rich, agricultural, and politically significant Western partner. Canada, for its part, cannot ignore the Chinese market, but it is not prepared to act as though the crises of recent years never happened.

Wang Yi may open a new phase of talks, but he cannot restore trust in a single visit. China does want to end the cold Canadian pause. Yet on this path it will encounter old trade disputes, technology restrictions, pressure from allies, suspicions within Canada, and competition over the markets of the future. Dialogue is likely to resume, but it will be cautious, difficult, and far less warm than Beijing might prefer.

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