In 1975 the first author proved that every finite tight two-person game form $g$ is Nash-solvable, that is, for every payoffs $u$ and $w$ of two players the obtained game $(g;u,w)$, in normal form, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies. This result was extended in several directions; here we strengthen it further. We construct two special NE realized by a lexicographically safe (lexsafe) strategy of one player and a best response of the other. We obtain a polynomial algorithm computing these lexsafe NE. This is trivial when game form $g$ is given explicitly. Yet, in applications $g$ is frequently realized by an oracle $\cO$ such that size of $g$ is exponential in size $|\cO|$ of $\cO$. We assume that game form $g = g(\cO)$ generated by $\cO$ is tight and that an arbitrary {\em win-lose game} $(g;u,w)$ (in which payoffs $u$ and $w$ are zero-sum and take only values $\pm 1$) can be solved, in time polynomial in $|\cO|$. These assumptions allow us to construct an algorithm computing two (one for each player) lexsafe NE in time polynomial in $|\cO|$. We consider four types of oracles known in the literature and show that all four satisfy the above assumptions.