Abstract:This study extends Blackwell's (1953) comparison of information to a sequential social learning model in which agents make decisions sequentially based on both private signals and observed actions of others. In this context, we introduce a binary relation over information structures: an information structure is {\it more socially valuable} than another if it yields higher expected payoffs for {\it all} agents, regardless of their preferences and equilibrium realizations. First, we establish that this binary relation is strictly stronger than the Blackwell order. Next, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for our binary relation and propose a simpler sufficient condition that is easier to verify. We further explore comparisons of information structures in terms of long-run payoffs, limit welfare, and canonical binary environments.
From: Hiroto Sato [view email]
[v1]
Thu, 6 Mar 2025 22:32:14 UTC (34 KB)
[v2]
Wed, 26 Mar 2025 03:26:25 UTC (36 KB)
[v3]
Fri, 26 Jun 2026 05:18:02 UTC (55 KB)
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