Recent years have seen several earnest initiatives from both academic researchers as well as open source communities to implement and deploy decentralized online social networks (DOSNs). The primary motivations for DOSNs are privacy and autonomy from big brotherly service providers. The promise of decentralization is complete freedom for end-users from any service providers both in terms of keeping privacy about content and communication, and also from any form of censorship. However decentralization introduces many challenges. One of the principal problems is to guarantee availability of data even when the data owner is not online, so that others can access the said data even when a node is offline or down. In this paper, we argue that a pragmatic design needs to explicitly allow for and leverage on system heterogeneity, and provide incentives for the resource rich participants in the system to contribute such resources. To that end we introduce SuperNova - a super-peer based DOSN architecture. While proposing the SuperNova architecture, we envision a dynamic system driven by incentives and reputation, however, investigation of such incentives and reputation, and its effect on determining peer behaviors is a subject for our future study. In this paper we instead investigate the efficacy of a super-peer based system at any time point (a snap-shot of the envisioned dynamic system), that is to say, we try to quantify the performance of SuperNova system given any (fixed) mix of peer population and strategies.