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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Copyright Traps for Large Language Models
Matthieu Meeus, Igor Shilov, Manuel Faysse, Yves-Alexandre de Mo · 2024-02-15 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Questions of fair use of copyright-protected content to train Large Language Models (LLMs) are being actively debated. Document-level inference has been proposed as a new task: inferring from black-box access to the trained model whether a piece of content has been seen during training. SOTA methods however rely on naturally occurring memorization of (part of) the content. While very effective against models that memorize significantly, we hypothesize--and later confirm--that they will not work against models that do not naturally memorize, e.g. medium-size 1B models. We here propose to use copyright traps, the inclusion of fictitious entries in original content, to detect the use of copyrighted materials in LLMs with a focus on models where memorization does not naturally occur. We carefully design a randomized controlled experimental setup, inserting traps into original content (books) and train a 1.3B LLM from scratch. We first validate that the use of content in our target model would be undetectable using existing methods. We then show, contrary to intuition, that even medium-length trap sentences repeated a significant number of times (100) are not detectable using existing methods. However, we show that longer sequences repeated a large number of times can be reliably detected (AUC=0.75) and used as copyright traps. Beyond copyright applications, our findings contribute to the study of LLM memorization: the randomized controlled setup enables us to draw causal relationships between memorization and certain sequence properties such as repetition in model training data and perplexity.