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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Enhancing Security of AI-Based Code Synthesis with GitHub...
Jakub Res, Ivan Homoliak, Martin Perešíni, Aleš Smrčka, Kamil Ma · 2024-03-19 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

AI assistants for coding are on the rise. However one of the reasons developers and companies avoid harnessing their full potential is the questionable security of the generated code. This paper first reviews the current state-of-the-art and identifies areas for improvement on this issue. Then, we propose a systematic approach based on prompt-altering methods to achieve better code security of (even proprietary black-box) AI-based code generators such as GitHub Copilot, while minimizing the complexity of the application from the user point-of-view, the computational resources, and operational costs. In sum, we propose and evaluate three prompt altering methods: (1) scenario-specific, (2) iterative, and (3) general clause, while we discuss their combination. Contrary to the audit of code security, the latter two of the proposed methods require no expert knowledge from the user. We assess the effectiveness of the proposed methods on the GitHub Copilot using the OpenVPN project in realistic scenarios, and we demonstrate that the proposed methods reduce the number of insecure generated code samples by up to 16\% and increase the number of secure code by up to 8\%. Since our approach does not require access to the internals of the AI models, it can be in general applied to any AI-based code synthesizer, not only GitHub Copilot.