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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
SA: Sliding attack for synthetic speech detection with re...
Deng JiaCheng, Dong Li, Yan Diqun, Wang Rangding, Zeng Jiaming · 2022-08-28 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples that mislead models with imperceptible perturbations. In audio, although adversarial examples have achieved incredible attack success rates on white-box settings and black-box settings, most existing adversarial attacks are constrained by the input length. A More practical scenario is that the adversarial examples must be clipped or self-spliced and input into the black-box model. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how to improve transferability in different input length settings. In this paper, we take the synthetic speech detection task as an example and consider two representative SOTA models. We observe that the gradients of fragments with the same sample value are similar in different models via analyzing the gradients obtained by feeding samples into the model after cropping or self-splicing. Inspired by the above observation, we propose a new adversarial attack method termed sliding attack. Specifically, we make each sampling point aware of gradients at different locations, which can simulate the situation where adversarial examples are input to black-box models with varying input lengths. Therefore, instead of using the current gradient directly in each iteration of the gradient calculation, we go through the following three steps. First, we extract subsegments of different lengths using sliding windows. We then augment the subsegments with data from the adjacent domains. Finally, we feed the sub-segments into different models to obtain aggregate gradients to update adversarial examples. Empirical results demonstrate that our method could significantly improve the transferability of adversarial examples after clipping or self-splicing. Besides, our method could also enhance the transferability between models based on different features.