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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
User Tracking in the Post-cookie Era: How Websites Bypass...
Emmanouil Papadogiannakis, Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Nicolas Kour · 2021-02-17 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

During the past few years, mostly as a result of the GDPR and the CCPA, websites have started to present users with cookie consent banners. These banners are web forms where the users can state their preference and declare which cookies they would like to accept, if such option exists. Although requesting consent before storing any identifiable information is a good start towards respecting the user privacy, yet previous research has shown that websites do not always respect user choices. Furthermore, considering the ever decreasing reliance of trackers on cookies and actions browser vendors take by blocking or restricting third-party cookies, we anticipate a world where stateless tracking emerges, either because trackers or websites do not use cookies, or because users simply refuse to accept any. In this paper, we explore whether websites use more persistent and sophisticated forms of tracking in order to track users who said they do not want cookies. Such forms of tracking include first-party ID leaking, ID synchronization, and browser fingerprinting. Our results suggest that websites do use such modern forms of tracking even before users had the opportunity to register their choice with respect to cookies. To add insult to injury, when users choose to raise their voice and reject all cookies, user tracking only intensifies. As a result, users' choices play very little role with respect to tracking: we measured that more than 75% of tracking activities happened before users had the opportunity to make a selection in the cookie consent banner, or when users chose to reject all cookies.