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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Adversarial Deep Reinforcement Learning for Cyber Securit...
Luke Borchjes, Clement Nyirenda, Louise Leenen · 2023-08-09 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

This paper focuses on the impact of leveraging autonomous offensive approaches in Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) to train more robust agents by exploring the impact of applying adversarial learning to DRL for autonomous security in Software Defined Networks (SDN). Two algorithms, Double Deep Q-Networks (DDQN) and Neural Episodic Control to Deep Q-Network (NEC2DQN or N2D), are compared. NEC2DQN was proposed in 2018 and is a new member of the deep q-network (DQN) family of algorithms. The attacker has full observability of the environment and access to a causative attack that uses state manipulation in an attempt to poison the learning process. The implementation of the attack is done under a white-box setting, in which the attacker has access to the defender's model and experiences. Two games are played; in the first game, DDQN is a defender and N2D is an attacker, and in second game, the roles are reversed. The games are played twice; first, without an active causative attack and secondly, with an active causative attack. For execution, three sets of game results are recorded in which a single set consists of 10 game runs. The before and after results are then compared in order to see if there was actually an improvement or degradation. The results show that with minute parameter changes made to the algorithms, there was growth in the attacker's role, since it is able to win games. Implementation of the adversarial learning by the introduction of the causative attack showed the algorithms are still able to defend the network according to their strengths.