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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Measuring Compliance of Consent Revocation on the Web
Gayatri Priyadarsini Kancherla, Nataliia Bielova, Cristiana Sant · 2024-11-23 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

The GDPR requires websites to facilitate the right to revoke consent from Web users. While numerous studies measured compliance of consent with the various consent requirements, no prior work has studied consent revocation on the Web. Therefore, it remains unclear how difficult it is to revoke consent on the websites' interfaces, nor whether revoked consent is properly stored and communicated behind the user interface. Our work aims to fill this gap by measuring compliance of consent revocation on the Web on the top-200 websites. We found that 19.87% of websites make it difficult for users to revoke consent throughout different interfaces, 20.5% of websites require more effort than acceptance, and 2.48% do not provide consent revocation at all, thus violating legal requirements for valid consent. 57.5% websites do not delete the cookies after consent revocation enabling continuous illegal processing of users' data. Moreover, we analyzed 281 websites implementing the IAB Europe TCF, and found 22 websites that store a positive consent despite user's revocation. Surprisingly, we found that on 101 websites, third parties that have received consent upon user's acceptance, are not informed of user's revocation, leading to the illegal processing of users' data by such third parties. Our findings emphasise the need for improved legal compliance of consent revocation, and proper, consistent, and uniform implementation of revocation communication and data deletion practices.