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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Trusting code in the wild: A social network-based central...
Nasif Imtiaz, Preya Shabrina, Laurie Williams · 2023-06-01 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

As modern software extensively uses open source packages, developers regularly pull in new upstream code through frequent updates. While a manual review of all upstream changes may not be practical, developers may rely on the authors' and reviewers' identities, among other factors, to decide what level of review the new code may require. The goal of this study is to help downstream project developers prioritize review efforts for upstream code by providing a social network-based centrality rating for the authors and reviewers of that code. To that end, we build a social network of 6,949 developers across the collaboration activity from 1,644 Rust packages. Further, we survey the developers in the network to evaluate if code coming from a developer with a higher centrality rating is likely to be accepted with lesser scrutiny by the downstream projects and, therefore, is perceived to be more trusted. Our results show that 97.7\% of the developers from the studied packages are interconnected via collaboration, with each developer separated from another via only four other developers in the network. The interconnection among developers from different Rust packages establishes the ground for identifying the central developers in the ecosystem. Our survey responses ($N=206$) show that the respondents are more likely to not differentiate between developers in deciding how to review upstream changes (60.2\% of the time). However, when they do differentiate, our statistical analysis showed a significant correlation between developers' centrality ratings and the level of scrutiny their code might face from the downstream projects, as indicated by the respondents.