Video feeds are often deliberately used as evidence, as in the case of CCTV footage; but more often than not, the existence of footage of a supposed event is perceived as proof of fact in the eyes of the public at large. This reliance represents a societal vulnerability given the existence of easy-to-use editing tools and means to fabricate entire video feeds using machine learning. And, as the recent barrage of fake news and fake porn videos have shown, this isn't merely an academic concern, it is actively been exploited. I posit that this exploitation is only going to get more insidious. In this position paper, I introduce a long term project that aims to mitigate some of the most egregious forms of manipulation by embedding trustworthy components in the video transmission chain. Unlike earlier works, I am not aiming to do tamper detection or other forms of forensics -- approaches I think are bound to fail in the face of the reality of necessary editing and compression -- instead, the aim here is to provide a way for the video publisher to prove the integrity of the video feed as well as make explicit any edits they may have performed. To do this, I present a novel data structure, a video-edit specification language and supporting infrastructure that provides end-to-end video provenance, from the camera sensor to the viewer. I have implemented a prototype of this system and am in talks with journalists and video editors to discuss the best ways forward with introducing this idea to the mainstream.