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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Multi-Agent Distributed Optimization With Feasible Set Pr...
Shreya Meel, Sennur Ulukus · 2025-10-07 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

We consider the problem of decentralized constrained optimization with multiple agents $E_1,\ldots,E_N$ who jointly wish to learn the optimal solution set while keeping their feasible sets $\mathcal{P}_1,\ldots,\mathcal{P}_N$ private from each other. We assume that the objective function $f$ is known to all agents and each feasible set is a collection of points from a universal alphabet $\mathcal{P}_{alph}$. A designated agent (leader) starts the communication with the remaining (non-leader) agents, and is the first to retrieve the solution set. The leader searches for the solution by sending queries to and receiving answers from the non-leaders, such that the information on the individual feasible sets revealed to the leader should be no more than nominal, i.e., what is revealed from learning the solution set alone. We develop achievable schemes for obtaining the solution set at nominal information leakage, and characterize their communication costs under two communication setups between agents. In this work, we focus on two kinds of network setups: i) ring, where each agent communicates with two adjacent agents, and ii) star, where only the leader communicates with the remaining agents. We show that, if the leader first learns the joint feasible set through an existing private set intersection (PSI) protocol and then deduces the solution set, the information leaked to the leader is greater than nominal. Moreover, we draw connection of our schemes to threshold PSI (ThPSI), which is a PSI-variant where the intersection is revealed only when its cardinality is larger than a threshold value. Finally, for various realizations of $f$ mapped uniformly at random to a fixed range of values, our schemes are more communication-efficient with a high probability compared to retrieving the entire feasible set through PSI.