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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Multi-phase IRC Botnet and Botnet Behavior Detection Model
Aymen Hasan Rashid Al Awadi, Bahari Belaton · 2015-01-13 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Botnets are considered one of the most dangerous and serious security threats facing the networks and the Internet. Comparing with the other security threats, botnet members have the ability to be directed and controlled via C&C messages from the botmaster over common protocols such as IRC and HTTP, or even over covert and unknown applications. As for IRC botnets, general security instances like firewalls and IDSes do not provide by themselves a viable solution to prevent them completely. These devices could not differentiate well between the legitimate and malicious traffic of the IRC protocol. So, this paper is proposing an IDS-based and multi-phase IRC botnet and botnet behavior detection model based on C&C responses messages and malicious behaviors of the IRC bots inside the network environment. The proposed model has been evaluated on five network traffic traces from two different network environments (Virtual network and DARPA 2000 Windows NT Attack Data Set). The results show that the proposed model could detect all the infected IRC botnet member(s), state their current status of attack, filter their malicious IRC messages, pass the other normal IRC messages and detect the botnet behavior regardless of the botnet communication protocol with very low false positive rate. The proposed model has been compared with some of the existing and well-known approaches, including BotHunter, BotSniffer and Rishi regarding botnet characteristics taken in each approach. The comparison showed that the proposed model has made a progress on the comparative models by not to rely on a certain time window or specific bot signatures.