Abstract:For decades, the Controller Area Network (CAN) has served as the primary in-vehicle bus (IVB), extending its use to many non-vehicular systems. In recent years, CAN security has been intensively scrutinized, yielding extensive research literature. Despite its wealth, the literature lacks structured systematization, complicating efforts to assess and compare attack severity, defense efficacy, security gaps, and root causes. This leaves many defenders uncertain about the relevance of specific attacks or defenses to their systems, and even whether CAN's security problems are truly CAN-specific. As newer IVBs emerge, this matters beyond CAN: if CAN's root causes are not CAN-specific, replacing CAN may only move its problems to a new standard. In this paper, we systematize CAN security knowledge, presenting a comprehensive taxonomy and assessment models of attackers, attacks, and defenses. We identify replicable attacks and defense gaps, and investigate their root causes to determine their exclusivity to the CAN standard. We then investigate whether those root causes appear in three emerging IVBs and assess their effectiveness in solving fundamental CAN security problems. Our findings challenge common perceptions: CAN is more securable than perceived, most of its insecurity root causes are shared across IVBs, and merely adopting newer IVB technology does not solve persistent security problems. We conclude by suggesting that securing future in-vehicle communication requires addressing shared root causes, and we propose four research directions with the most promising potential.
From: Khaled Serag Alsharif [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 3 Oct 2025 12:52:28 UTC (1,034 KB)
[v2]
Thu, 17 Sep 2026 09:01:07 UTC (5,113 KB)
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