惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

aimingoo的专栏
aimingoo的专栏
月光博客
月光博客
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
阮一峰的网络日志
阮一峰的网络日志
博客园_首页
Last Week in AI
Last Week in AI
The Cloudflare Blog
IT之家
IT之家
Hugging Face - Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
美团技术团队
S
SegmentFault 最新的问题
量子位
大猫的无限游戏
大猫的无限游戏
Recent Announcements
Recent Announcements
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft Security Blog
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
I
InfoQ
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
G
Google Developers Blog
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
Engineering at Meta
Engineering at Meta

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
00
Nguyen Thoi Minh Quan · 2021-12-15 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

What is the funniest number in cryptography (Episode 2)? 0 [1]. The reason is that $\forall x, x \cdot 0 = 0$, i.e., the equation is satisfied no matter what $x$ is. We'll use zero to attack zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). In particular, we'll discuss a critical issue in a cutting-edge ZKP PLONK [2] C++ implementation which allows an attacker to create a forged proof that all verifiers will accept. We'll show how theory guides the attack's direction. In practice, the attack works like a charm and we'll show how the attack falls through a chain of perfectly aligned software cracks. In the same codebase, there is an independent critical ECDSA bug where (r, s) = (0, 0) is a valid signature for arbitrary keys and messages, but we won't discuss it further because it's a known ECDSA attack vector in the Google Wycheproof cryptanalysis project [3] that I worked on a few years ago. All bugs have been responsibly disclosed through the vendor's bug bounty program with total reward $\sim \$15,000$ (thank you).