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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Dynamic data fusion using multi-input models for malware ...
Viktor Zenkov, Jason Laska · 2019-09-22 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Criminals use malware to disrupt cyber-systems. The number of these malware-vulnerable systems is increasing quickly as common systems, such as vehicles, routers, and lightbulbs, become increasingly interconnected cyber-systems. To address the scale of this problem, analysts divide malware into classes and develop, for each class, a specialized defense. In this project we classified malware with machine learning. In particular, we used a supervised multi-class long short term memory (LSTM) model. We trained the algorithm with thousands of malware files annotated with class labels (the training set), and the algorithm learned patterns indicative of each class. We used disassembled malware files (provided by Microsoft) and separated the constituent data into parsed instructions, which look like human-readable machine code text, and raw bytes, which are hexadecimal values. We are interested in which format, text or hex, is more valuable as input for classification. To solve this, we investigated four cases: a text-only model, a hexadecimal-only model, a multi-input model using both text and hexadecimal inputs, and a model based on combining the individual results. We performed this investigation using the machine learning Python package Keras, which allows easily configurable deep learning architectures and training. We hoped to understand the trade-offs between the different formats. Due to the class imbalance in the data, we used multiple methods to compare the formats, using test accuracies, balanced accuracies (taking into account weights of classes), and an accuracy derived from tables of confusion. We found that the multi-input model, which allows learning on both input types simultaneously, resulted in the best performance. Our finding expedites malware classification research by providing researchers a suitable deep learning architecture to train a tailored version to their malware.