惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

G
Google Developers Blog
酷 壳 – CoolShell
酷 壳 – CoolShell
量子位
C
Check Point Blog
B
Blog RSS Feed
Y
Y Combinator Blog
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
A
About on SuperTechFans
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
博客园 - 聂微东
阮一峰的网络日志
阮一峰的网络日志
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
小众软件
小众软件
Last Week in AI
Last Week in AI
博客园 - 【当耐特】
GbyAI
GbyAI
The Cloudflare Blog
博客园 - 叶小钗
S
SegmentFault 最新的问题
博客园 - Franky
Engineering at Meta
Engineering at Meta
F
Fortinet All Blogs
B
Blog
Jina AI
Jina AI

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Transferable Self-Evolving Playbooks for Agentic Security...
[Submitted on 15 Jun 2026] · 2026-06-16 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

View PDF HTML (experimental)

Abstract:An LLM agent for vulnerability discovery and validation is more than a model. It combines three components: an LLM for code analysis, an agent harness such as Codex or OpenCode for navigation, tool use, and execution, and an audit playbook, domain-specific procedural knowledge that guides the LLM and harness toward vulnerability discovery. Prior work relies on human-supplied playbooks, including prompt engineering, manual workflows, knowledge bases, and heuristics. This raises two research questions: Acquisition - is human curation necessary, and can playbook creation be automated? Transfer - can an evolved playbook transfer the audit procedure to weaker agents, improving their capability?
We present EvoHunt, a playbook evolution environment over open-source repositories for security auditing. Three agents drive the evolution loop: an audit agent rolls out the current playbook and produces findings; an evaluator scores outcomes against ground truth; and a reviser commits updates to the playbook based on failure analysis. The playbook format is unconstrained: starting empty, EvoHunt adds or removes workflows, heuristics, vulnerability knowledge, or domain-specific content. The evolved playbook requires only minor adaptation to run under a different LLM or harness.
We evaluate EvoHunt on open-source security advisories. For acquisition, playbook evolution raises end-to-end exploits for Codex/GPT5.4-xhigh 6x, from 1.1% to 6.2%, and the evolved OpenCode/GLM5.1 playbook surpasses OpenAI Codex Security on every metric, with 11.3% vs. 9.2% target-match rate, showing open-source evolution can outperform a dedicated commercial product. For transfer, the GLM-evolved playbook gives the strongest student lift: Qwen3.6-27B improves from 2.4% to 6.5%, Qwen3.6-35B-A3B from 1.1% to 4.6%, and A3B obtains 2.4x more matches than GPT transfer.

Submission history

From: Ziyue Wang [view email]
[v1] Mon, 15 Jun 2026 08:57:45 UTC (1,756 KB)