惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
WordPress大学
WordPress大学
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
V
Visual Studio Blog
月光博客
月光博客
Hugging Face - Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
小众软件
小众软件
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
博客园 - Franky
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
Last Week in AI
Last Week in AI
阮一峰的网络日志
阮一峰的网络日志
量子位
有赞技术团队
有赞技术团队
酷 壳 – CoolShell
酷 壳 – CoolShell
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research
博客园_首页
Jina AI
Jina AI
雷峰网
雷峰网
博客园 - 【当耐特】
博客园 - 叶小钗
美团技术团队
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
IT之家
IT之家

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Incalmo: An Autonomous LLM-assisted System for Red Teamin...
Brian Singer, Keane Lucas, Lakshmi Adiga, Meghna Jain, Lujo Baue · 2025-01-28 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Security operators use red teams to simulate real attackers and proactively find defense gaps. In realistic enterprise settings, this involves executing multi-host network attacks spanning many "stepping stone" hosts. Unfortunately, red teams are expensive and entail significant expertise and effort. Given the promise of LLMs in CTF challenges, we first analyze if LLMs can autonomously execute multi-host red team exercises. We find that state-of-the-art LLM-assisted offense systems (e.g., PentestGPT, CyberSecEval3) with leading LLMs (e.g., Sonnet 4, Gemini 2.5 Pro) are unable to do so. Building on our observations in understanding the failure modes of state-of-the-art systems, we argue the need to improve the abstractions and interfaces for LLM-assisted red teaming. Based on this insight, we present the design and implementation of Incalmo, an LLM-assisted system for autonomously red teaming multi-host networks. Incalmo uses LLMs to plan red team exercises in terms of high-level declarative tasks that are executed by domain-specific task agents. Incalmo also uses auxiliary services to manage context and acquired assets. For our evaluation, we develop MHBench, a novel multi-host attack benchmark with 40 realistic emulated networks (from 22 to 50 hosts). We find that Incalmo successfully acquires critical assets (i.e., key hosts or data) in 37 out of 40 MHBench environments. In contrast, state-of-the-art LLM-assisted systems succeed in only 3 out of 40 environments. We show that Incalmo is efficient-successful attacks took 12-54 minutes and cost <$15 in LLM credits.