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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Disttack: Graph Adversarial Attacks Toward Distributed GN...
Yuxiang Zhang, Xin Liu, Meng Wu, Wei Yan, Mingyu Yan, Xiaochun Y · 2024-05-10 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have emerged as potent models for graph learning. Distributing the training process across multiple computing nodes is the most promising solution to address the challenges of ever-growing real-world graphs. However, current adversarial attack methods on GNNs neglect the characteristics and applications of the distributed scenario, leading to suboptimal performance and inefficiency in attacking distributed GNN training. In this study, we introduce Disttack, the first framework of adversarial attacks for distributed GNN training that leverages the characteristics of frequent gradient updates in a distributed system. Specifically, Disttack corrupts distributed GNN training by injecting adversarial attacks into one single computing node. The attacked subgraphs are precisely perturbed to induce an abnormal gradient ascent in backpropagation, disrupting gradient synchronization between computing nodes and thus leading to a significant performance decline of the trained GNN. We evaluate Disttack on four large real-world graphs by attacking five widely adopted GNNs. Compared with the state-of-the-art attack method, experimental results demonstrate that Disttack amplifies the model accuracy degradation by 2.75$\times$ and achieves speedup by 17.33$\times$ on average while maintaining unnoticeability.