Recently, the WebAssembly (or Wasm) technology has been rapidly evolving, with many runtimes actively under development, providing cross-platform secure sandboxes for Wasm modules to run as portable containers. Compared with Docker, which isolates applications at the operating system level, Wasm runtimes provide more security mechanisms, such as linear memory, type checking, and protected call stacks. Although Wasm is designed with security in mind and considered to be a more secure container runtime, various security challenges have arisen, and researchers have focused on the security of Wasm runtimes, such as discovering vulnerabilities or proposing new security mechanisms to achieve robust isolation. However, we have observed that the resource isolation is not well protected by the current Wasm runtimes, and attackers can exhaust the host's resources to interfere with the execution of other container instances by exploiting the WASI/WASIX interfaces. And the attack surface has not been well explored and measured. In this paper, we explore the resource isolation attack surface of Wasm runtimes systematically by proposing several static Wasm runtime analysis approaches. Based on the analysis results, we propose several exploitation strategies to break the resource isolation of Wasm runtimes. The experimental results show that malicious Wasm instances can not only consume large amounts of system resources on their own but also introduce high workloads into other components of the underlying operating system, leading to a substantial performance degradation of the whole system. In addition, the mitigation approaches have also been discussed.