惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

Jina AI
Jina AI
MyScale Blog
MyScale Blog
量子位
月光博客
月光博客
J
Java Code Geeks
A
About on SuperTechFans
H
Hackread – Cybersecurity News, Data Breaches, AI and More
U
Unit 42
WordPress大学
WordPress大学
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
腾讯CDC
G
Google Developers Blog
博客园 - 【当耐特】
Engineering at Meta
Engineering at Meta
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
IT之家
IT之家
N
Netflix TechBlog - Medium
Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft Security Blog
博客园 - 叶小钗
B
Blog
Martin Fowler
Martin Fowler
P
Proofpoint News Feed
B
Blog RSS Feed

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Semantic Host-free Trojan Attack
Haripriya Harikumar, Kien Do, Santu Rana, Sunil Gupta, Svetha Ve · 2021-10-26 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

In this paper, we propose a novel host-free Trojan attack with triggers that are fixed in the semantic space but not necessarily in the pixel space. In contrast to existing Trojan attacks which use clean input images as hosts to carry small, meaningless trigger patterns, our attack considers triggers as full-sized images belonging to a semantically meaningful object class. Since in our attack, the backdoored classifier is encouraged to memorize the abstract semantics of the trigger images than any specific fixed pattern, it can be later triggered by semantically similar but different looking images. This makes our attack more practical to be applied in the real-world and harder to defend against. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that with only a small number of Trojan patterns for training, our attack can generalize well to new patterns of the same Trojan class and can bypass state-of-the-art defense methods.