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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
OpenAPI Specification Extended Security Scheme: A method ...
Rami Haddad, Rim El Malki, Daniel Cozma · 2022-12-13 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

APIs have become the prominent technology of choice for achieving inter-service communications. The growth of API deployments has driven the urgency in addressing its lack of security standards. API Security is a topic for concern given the absence of standardized authorization in the OpenAPI standard, improper authorization opens the possibility for known and unknown vulnerabilities, which in the past years have been exploited by malicious actors resulting in data loss. This paper examines the number one vulnerability in API Security: Broken Object Level Authorization(BOLA), and proposes methods and tools to reduce the prevalence of this vulnerability. BOLA affects various API frameworks, our scope is fixated on the OpenAPI Specification(OAS). The OAS is a standard for describing and implementing APIs; popular OAS Implementations are FastAPI, Connexion (Flask), and many more. These implementations carry the pros and cons that are associated with the OASs knowledge of API properties. The Open API Specifications security properties do not address object authorization and provide no standardized approach to define such object properties. This leaves object-level security at the mercy of developers, which presents an increased risk of unintentionally creating attack vectors. Our aim is to tackle this void by introducing 1) the OAS ESS (OpenAPI Specification Extended Security Scheme) which includes declarative security controls for objects in OAS (design-based approach), and 2) an authorization module that can be imported to API services (Flask/FastAPI) to enforce authorization checks at the object level (development-based approach). When building an API service, a developer can start with the API design (specification) or its code. In both cases, a set of mechanisms are introduced to help developers mitigate and reduce the prevalence of BOLA.