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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Challenges and New Directions in Augmented Reality, Compu...
Stefano Baldassi, Tadayoshi Kohno, Franziska Roesner, Moqian Tia · 2018-06-28 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Rapidly advancing AR technologies are in a unique position to directly mediate between the human brain and the physical world. Though this tight coupling presents tremendous opportunities for human augmentation, it also presents new risks due to potential adversaries, including AR applications or devices themselves, as well as bugs or accidents. In this paper, we begin exploring potential risks to the human brain from augmented reality. Our initial focus is on sensory and perceptual risks (e.g., accidentally or maliciously induced visual adaptations, motion-induced blindness, and photosensitive epilepsy), but similar risks may span both lower- and higher-level human brain functions, including cognition, memory, and decision-making. Though they have not yet manifested in practice in early-generation AR technologies, we believe that such risks are uniquely dangerous in AR due to the richness and depth with which it interacts with a user's experience of the physical world. We propose a framework, based in computer security threat modeling, to conceptually and experimentally evaluate such risks. The ultimate goal of our work is to aid AR technology developers, researchers, and neuroscientists to consider these issues before AR technologies are widely deployed and become targets for real adversaries. By considering and addressing these issues now, we can help ensure that future AR technologies can meet their full, positive potential.