In a conference centre in The Hague last October, a roomful of Asia-watching European officials and experts were gathered for a symposium on relations with China when news broke that Beijing was expanding export controls on rare earths and other minerals.

Crucially, there was now an extraterritorial element: China could deny exports not only to direct buyers, but also restrict products made in third countries if they contained Chinese-origin rare earth content or controlled inputs.

In practice, that meant Beijing gained the ability to choke parts of European hi-tech and industrial supply chains even when the manufacturing was done outside China. Beijing could also hamper efforts to arm Ukraine in its war against Russia should, say, a drone contain a trace of a Chinese rare earth.

During a panel discussion that day, Dominic Porter – who manages relations with China at the EU’s External Action Service, its de facto foreign office – was asked if this was the lowest point in the bilateral relationship.

“It’s not the most fun thing for a diplomat to say that I’ve been shepherding a steadily declining relationship on a daily basis for the last four years and trying to manage decline … but it’s hard to disagree,” Porter said.

The October controls were eventually paused when Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump met in Busan, South Korea, later that month, much to Europe’s relief, but they have hung like a sword of Damocles over Europe ever since.