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Abstract:A central challenge in scientific inference is to produce uncertainty assessments that are both situation-specific and frequency-calibrated. This article examines inferential models (IMs) as a framework for prior-free probabilistic reasoning with scientific uncertainty. The central IM idea is to view the auxiliary variables in a sampling model as the source of model-based uncertainty. R. A. Fisher's fiducial inference transfers auxiliary randomness to the parameter space before applying probability calculus; IMs instead predict the unobserved auxiliary value with calibrated predictive random sets (PRSs) and transfer the resulting plausibility statements only afterward. This change in order yields valid uncertainty assessments and clarifies the relations among Fisherian fiducial reasoning, Neymanian confidence theory, Dempster-Shafer belief functions, generalized fiducial inference, and IMs. By comparing IMs with objective-prior Bayesian inference, the article argues that E. T. Jaynes' logic-of-science ambition can be continued without forcing all scientific uncertainty into a precise prior distribution because calibrated imprecision is often essential. Finally, the article suggests that a differential-geometric theory of IMs may be within reach, offering a possible route to foundational questions traditionally framed in terms of the likelihood principle.

Submission history

From: Chuanhai Liu [view email]
[v1] Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:25:59 UTC (124 KB)