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Sansec - experts in eCommerce security

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Magento Developers Impersonated in Targeted GitHub Malwar...
Sansec Forensics Team · 2026-02-11 · via Sansec - experts in eCommerce security

Rob Aimes alerted us to malicious GitHub repositories targeting Magento developers. The repos pose as legitimate tools but deliver Windows malware: a RAT and keylogger bundled as a LuaJIT package. The campaign is part of the FakeGit operation.

How the attack works

The attackers create repositories with luring names: deployment tools, Docker images, and configuration utilities. To appear trustworthy, they copy code from real open source projects, preserving the original commit history. This causes legit authors' avatars to appear in the "Contributors" section.

Fake GitHub repository README with Download Now link delivering malware

All repositories were created within the past 24 hours, though their commit timestamps appear older. These timestamps are fabricated.

By reusing commits from legitimate projects, the attackers make real open source contributors appear in the repository sidebar:

GitHub contributors section showing malicious RBT-69 account alongside legitimate Magento developer Thomas Klein

The publishing accounts share a distinctive activity pattern: dormant for months, then suddenly active:

GitHub activity graph showing suspicious commit pattern with sudden burst of activity

Malicious repositories

Sansec identified these malicious GitHub accounts and repositories:

  • github.com/Uros5294/magento2-static-deploy
  • github.com/RBT-69/magento2-application
  • github.com/suhanimish12/magento-frankenphp-images
  • github.com/saddam237262/configdiff
  • github.com/Sultanzacki9506/Google_Manager
  • github.com/NobreTakeshi/claude-code-magento-agents
  • github.com/ske1et2/Telegrams-Best-Scrapper
  • github.com/priya77771/module-widgetkit
RepositoryOriginal AuthorMost Recent Committer Email
Uros5294/magento2-static-deploypeterjaap (peterjaap@elgentos.nl)
61800321+Uros5294@users.noreply.github.com
RBT-69/magento2-applicationThomas Klein (thomasklein876@gmail.com)tirouvingadamebaala@gmail.com
suhanimish12/magento-frankenphp-imagesMohamed El Mrabet (mimou78@gmail.com)suhani.tfa@gmail.com
saddam237262/configdiffPaul Frederiksen (paul@paulfrederiksen.com)
145244102+saddam237262@users.noreply.github.com
Sultanzacki9506/Google_ManagerSultanzacki9506 (sultanzacky0@gmail.com)sultanzacky0@gmail.com
NobreTakeshi/claude-code-magento-agentsNobreTakeshi (anime9x72@gmail.com)anime9x72@gmail.com
ske1et2/Telegrams-Best-ScrapperSkillSany (ClementinaBaptise59@hotmail.com)osman.zhazaev12@gmail.com

Payload analysis

Visitors are encouraged to download a ZIP file containing the "application." Inside is a self-contained LuaJIT runtime with an obfuscated Lua script. The package structure follows a consistent pattern across all repositories:

Launcher.bat (or Launcher.cmd)
lua51.dll
luajit.exe
[payload].txt        # obfuscated Lua script (clx.txt, clib.txt, arch.txt, tcp.log)

The Lua script, when executed via the batch launcher, deploys a RAT and keylogger targeting Windows systems.

Indicators of Compromise

File hashes (SHA1)

The LuaJIT runtime is identical across all samples:

FileSHA1
lua51.dll270f66d2c84ee86ff4b07c6220c51abd4897b5f0
luajit.exef5199b4191add11d02d58f521cbea21465b7ff6b

Launcher scripts and obfuscated payloads vary per repository:

7adf9cf2b2cc720aa6ba45ef1be6e423e9576fed  Manager_Google_1.0/Launcher.bat
6911c27ebedcad66076a8abf3c2d182ccf559feb  Manager_Google_1.0/clx.txt
270f66d2c84ee86ff4b07c6220c51abd4897b5f0  Manager_Google_1.0/lua51.dll
f5199b4191add11d02d58f521cbea21465b7ff6b  Manager_Google_1.0/luajit.exe
7adf9cf2b2cc720aa6ba45ef1be6e423e9576fed  Software_2.5-beta.5/Launcher.bat
a72a4990db017897d37759f991e1c1515171c77b  Software_2.5-beta.5/clx.txt
270f66d2c84ee86ff4b07c6220c51abd4897b5f0  Software_2.5-beta.5/lua51.dll
f5199b4191add11d02d58f521cbea21465b7ff6b  Software_2.5-beta.5/luajit.exe
29ee31ee046198594bb712d186a14a49d1346a50  claude-code-magento-agents/Launcher.cmd
270f66d2c84ee86ff4b07c6220c51abd4897b5f0  claude-code-magento-agents/lua51.dll
f5199b4191add11d02d58f521cbea21465b7ff6b  claude-code-magento-agents/luajit.exe
239087899df69b7ef9ba5d9716e3312c73c800ba  claude-code-magento-agents/tcp.log
a6de13e6a4aef51f7b2bc298181ee5e02dd94861  magento-frankenphp-images_2.4/Launcher.cmd
bef485d8b3ab03ec389b984a231369f9aa2852c0  magento-frankenphp-images_2.4/clib.txt
270f66d2c84ee86ff4b07c6220c51abd4897b5f0  magento-frankenphp-images_2.4/lua51.dll
f5199b4191add11d02d58f521cbea21465b7ff6b  magento-frankenphp-images_2.4/luajit.exe
df37352a15f99cb79f88d412bf20b145f83cbd12  static_deploy_magento_v1.9/Launcher.cmd
c6c9d7de860a848e4053acca3993d2d914889e64  static_deploy_magento_v1.9/arch.txt

Malicious GitHub accounts

  • Uros5294
  • RBT-69
  • suhanimish12
  • saddam237262
  • Sultanzacki9506
  • NobreTakeshi
  • ske1et2

Recommendations

  1. Verify repository authenticity: check the account age, activity history, and whether the repository is linked from official project documentation
  2. Never run downloaded executables from untrusted sources, especially batch files that launch interpreters
  3. Report suspicious repositories to GitHub via their abuse reporting system
  4. If you downloaded and executed any of these packages, scan your system for malware immediately

For Magento store owners, run eComscan to detect any compromise on your server infrastructure.

You can monitor for new malicious repositories via GitHub's search, sorted by most recently updated.

Read more