Access control is a cornerstone of secure computing, yet large language models often blur role boundaries by producing unrestricted responses. We study role-conditioned refusals, focusing on the LLM's ability to adhere to access control policies by answering when authorized and refusing when not. To evaluate this behavior, we created a novel dataset that extends the Spider and BIRD text-to-SQL datasets, both of which have been modified with realistic PostgreSQL role-based policies at the table and column levels. We compare three designs: (i) zero or few-shot prompting, (ii) a two-step generator-verifier pipeline that checks SQL against policy, and (iii) LoRA fine-tuned models that learn permission awareness directly. Across multiple model families, explicit verification (the two-step framework) improves refusal precision and lowers false permits. At the same time, fine-tuning achieves a stronger balance between safety and utility (i.e., when considering execution accuracy). Longer and more complex policies consistently reduce the reliability of all systems. We release RBAC-augmented datasets and code.