





















Robust protection comes from layers, and many of you are already familiar with the Swiss Cheese Model. Simply stated, even when you're confident in your primary controls, that confidence only grows with each additional layer added. Because who wants to have a defense that’s built around a single slice of sad cheese, wrapped in a pitiful film of plastic? No thanks, we’ll take that sturdy block of Swiss each and every time.
Of course, given how thin most security teams are spread, robust layering is often easier said than done. Not every security team has the luxury of dedicated Detection Engineers to craft, research and develop custom logic to catch threat actor activity, and not every security team has the time and skill to synthesize and recreate our logic in other SIEM platforms. With this in mind, Okta Security recently published a number of our bespoke detections.
“But,” quoth the game show hosts, “ that’s not all!” Today we’re excited to share that Chronicle and Okta have been collaborating to help these detections reach an even wider audience. And this time around, the Chronicle team threw a few extra slices of cheese on top!
Not only did they rewrite these detections for their environment, they also did their own research and wrote additional detections. You can read more about each of them over at Chronicle’s blog. We’ve described them below too.
To channel the words of Oprah, “You get a new detection, and you get a new detection, and you get a new detection!”
ID | |
Technique | Phishing |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | Okta provides a platform detection for when a user enrolled in FastPass fails to authenticate via a real-time AiTM phishing proxy. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "user.authentication.auth_via_mfa" AND result eq "FAILURE" AND outcome.reason eq "FastPass declined phishing attempt" |
ID | |
Technique | Brute Force |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | NEW: Detects when an Okta user rejects more than 2 Push notifications in a 10 minute window. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | Okta Identity Engine eventType eq "user.authentication.auth_via_mfa" AND outcome.result="FAILURE" and outcome.reason="INVALID_CREDENTIALS" and debugContext.debugData.factor eq "OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH" Okta Classic Engine eventType eq "user.mfa.okta_verify.deny_push" |
ID | |
Technique | Valid Account |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | NEW: An Okta user reports suspicious activity in response to an end user security notification. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser" |
ID | |
Technique | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | NEW: Okta ThreatInsight detects multiple login failures from the same IP across one or more Okta orgs |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "security.threat.detected" and outcome.reason eq "Login Failures" |
ID | |
Technique | Brute Force |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | NEW: Okta ThreatInsight detects access requests from known malicious IPs targeting a specific org. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "security.attack.start" |
ID | |
Technique | Brute Force: Credential Stuffing |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | Okta's ThreatInsight can identify multiple login failures with high unknown users count from the same IP across one or more Okta orgs. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "security.threat.detected" AND outcome.reason co "Login failures with high unknown users count" |
ID | |
Technique | Brute Force: Password Spraying |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | Okta's ThreatInsight can identify Password Spray attacks. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "security.threat.detected" and outcome.reason eq "Password Spray" |
ID | |
Technique | Valid Accounts |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | NEW: Detects successfully authenticated user logins based on Okta's Behavior Detection pattern analysis. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | outcome.result eq "SUCCESS" and debugContext.debugData.risk co "HIGH" |
ID | |
Technique | Valid Accounts |
Chronicle identifier | |
Description | NEW: Detects when a user's account is locked out or a user account has reached the lockout limit. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "user.account.lock" |
ID | |
Technique | Valid Accounts |
Chronicle Identifier | |
Description | NEW: Detects when a new API token is created. |
Okta Reference | |
Okta System Log Query | eventType eq "system.api_token.create" |
We found this exercise to be fulfilling. Writing YARA-L queries is new to us, but they have been super easy to read and collaborate on. Even if you’re not a Chronicle customer, you might find it valuable to read the detection logic in Chronicle to frame your thinking about how you might go about detecting these types of threats.
What’s next?
Once we’re happy with our detections, phishing resistant factors and other control slices; where should we invest our energy next? I’d suggest considering what an adversary might now need to do for persistence and lateral movement. Perhaps they could socially engineer a new factor, a managed device or even a whole new account?
Best get thinking about how you’d detect:
User factors added or modified (user.mfa.factor*)
New users created (user.lifecycle.create)
Devices added to MDM
Remote Monitoring and Management tool installation or execution
VM installation on workstations
Duplicate hostnames
Gouda luck!
The Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) team is responsible for detecting and responding to cyber threats that impact Okta or our customers via the Okta platform. Our intelligence-driven capability identifies the adversaries most likely to impact Okta and our customers, and prioritises our defensive capabilities based on the threats most likely to be realised.
此内容由惯性聚合(RSS阅读器)自动聚合整理,仅供阅读参考。 原文来自 — 版权归原作者所有。