Paper 2024/1957

NICE-PAKE: On the Security of KEM-Based PAKE Constructions without Ideal Ciphers

Jacob Alperin-Sheriff, Independent Researcher

Daniel Apon, The MITRE Corporation

Gareth T. Davies, NXP Semiconductors

Alexander Wiesmaier, Hochschule Darmstadt

Abstract

We present the No IC Encryption (NICE)-PAKE, a (semi)-generic symmetric Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) framework providing a quantum-safe alternative for the Ideal Cipher (IC), utilizing simpler cryptographic components for the authentication step. To give a formal proof, we introduce the notions of A-Part Secrecy (A-SEC-CCA), Splittable Collision Freeness (A-CFR-CCA) and Public Key Uniformity (SPLIT-PKU) for splittable LWE KEMs. We show the relation of the former to the Non-uniform LWE and the Weak-Hint LWE assumptions, as well as its application to Ring and Module LWE. Finally, we show how to obtain a secure PAKE from our construction with concrete parameter choices for lattice KEMs.

Note: Revised notation and updated acknowledgments.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1957,
      author = {Nouri Alnahawi and Jacob Alperin-Sheriff and Daniel Apon and Gareth T. Davies and Alexander Wiesmaier},
      title = {{NICE}-{PAKE}: On the Security of {KEM}-Based {PAKE} Constructions without Ideal Ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1957},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {10.62056/abksr-iuc},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1957}
}