Paper 2026/727

Automated formal analysis of Signal’s Double Ratchet: attacks, fixes and security proofs

Charlie Jacomme, Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Inria, LORIA

Jessica Richards, University of Oxford

Abstract

The Double Ratchet (DR) protocol is a core security component of several end-to-end encrypted communications services, primarily Signal Messenger, WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger, servicing billions of users. In this work, we provide the first formal analysis of the DR covering all of its features, including out-of-order message arrivals. This analysis is highly automated, allows for all possible key compromises and notably proves Post-Compromise Security (PCS). We also provide partial results for the security of more complex protocol variants, these being the extension of the DR with encrypted headers, and composition with PQXDH as the initial key-exchange. Our analysis uncovered three attacks on the protocol, two of which we confirmed to be present in the main implementation, and a third which exists in the specification. Each of these attacks weakened or broke Forward Secrecy, and are to the best of our knowledge the first such known attacks. In each case, the issues were reported to the Signal developers and subsequently fixed. Overall, our analysis provides new guarantees of the security of Signal Messenger, and demonstrates the high level of security provided by the DR under a variety of strong threat models.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/727,
      author = {Vincent Cheval and Charlie Jacomme and Jessica Richards},
      title = {Automated formal analysis of Signal’s Double Ratchet: attacks, fixes and security proofs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/727},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/727}
}