RAMP was not just another dark web forum. It was one of the clearest examples of how ransomware has become an organized marketplace, with sellers, buyers, brokers, and recruiters all playing different roles in the same criminal ecosystem.
A leaked database from RAMP gives us a rare look behind the curtain. It shows how cybercrime works when it becomes structured, commercial, and repeatable. Instead of random hackers acting alone, RAMP functioned like a business platform where criminals could sell access, recruit affiliates, advertise ransomware, and negotiate deals in private.
The leaked data covers activity from November 2021 to January 2024 and includes user records, forum threads, private messages, IP logs, and admin activity. That matters because it shows both the public side of the forum and the hidden conversations that helped turn forum posts into real attacks.
“Comparitech gained exclusive access to a leaked database from RAMP. The full MySQL dump contains user records, forum threads, private messages, IP logs, and admin activity spanning November 2021 through January 2024.” reads the analysis published by Comparitech.
The scale is significant. Comparitech’s analysis found 7,707 registered users, 1,732 forum threads, 340,333 IP log records, 1,899 private conversations, and 3,875 private messages. In other words, this was not a small corner of the internet. It was a large criminal marketplace with a lot of movement and a lot of participants.
| Metric | Figure |
|---|---|
| Registered users | 7,707 |
| Forum threads | 1,732 |
| IP log records | 340,333 |
| Private conversations | 1,899 |
| Private messages | 3,875 |
| RaaS programs advertised | 14 |
| Leak sites referenced | 250+ |
These numbers show a mature underground community, not a loose collection of opportunists.
RAMP became popular because it supported the full ransomware chain. That means it was not only a place to talk about attacks. It was a place to buy access, find partners, exchange tools, and recruit affiliates.
The forum’s access market was especially important. The database shows 333 threads offering access to compromised corporate networks. That is a big deal, because initial access is often the hardest part of a ransomware operation. Once criminals get inside a network, the rest of the attack becomes much easier.
The forum also hosted 60 threads in its ransomware-as-a-service section. That section revealed a growing trend toward generous profit splits, with affiliates getting up to 90% of ransom payments in some cases. That kind of arrangement helps explain why ransomware keeps attracting new actors. It is a criminal business model designed to scale.
| Category | What it tells us |
|---|---|
| Access listings | Criminals were selling entry into real corporate networks |
| RaaS recruitment | Operators were hiring affiliates to spread attacks |
| Private messages | Deals were negotiated behind the scenes |
| IP logs | Activity was tracked and monitored at scale |
This mix of public listings and private negotiations shows how ransomware markets move from advertisement to execution.
The leak also shows what kinds of organizations were being targeted. RAMP listings included defense contractors, banks, hospitals, energy companies, technology firms, and government agencies across more than 20 countries.
The United States was the top target. It appeared in 40% of listings where a country could be identified. Government agencies were the most targeted sector, with 21 listings, followed by finance and banking, and technology and telecom, each with 11 listings.
That pattern is important. It shows that ransomware actors are not just chasing easy victims. They are targeting organizations that are likely to be pressured into paying because they cannot afford downtime, data loss, or public exposure.
The most revealing part of the leak may be the private conversations. The database included 1,899 conversations and 3,875 messages. These messages covered topics like VPN access, stealer logs, and private RaaS partnership requests.
That hidden layer matters because public forum posts do not tell the whole story. A public listing can advertise access, but a private conversation is where the real business happens. This is where criminals confirm details, negotiate price, and decide whether a listing is worth moving forward.
The leaked data also suggests that a single access broker posted 41 separate listings. That suggests some actors were operating like wholesalers, moving multiple entry points into corporate networks rather than focusing on just one victim.
RAMP helps explain why ransomware remains such a serious threat. The forum made it easier for criminals to specialize. One person could steal access, another could sell malware, and another could launch the final attack. That division of labor makes ransomware faster, cheaper, and harder to stop.
It also shows why law enforcement pressure does not automatically end the problem. Even when a major forum is disrupted, the ecosystem can fragment and move elsewhere. Criminal markets often adapt rather than disappear.
In practice, this means defenders need to think beyond malware alone. They need to monitor stolen credentials, exposed remote access, suspicious logins, and signs of initial access being sold or traded. The earliest stage of the attack chain is often the most important one to catch.
The RAMP leak reinforces a simple lesson: ransomware is an ecosystem, not just a piece of malware. If attackers can buy access, recruit help, and sell stolen access in one place, then defenders need to protect every stage of the environment, from identity to endpoint to remote access.
Organizations should focus on a few practical controls:
The leaked database is valuable because it shows the real machinery behind ransomware. It is not just about encryption at the end of an attack. It is about the marketplace that makes the attack possible in the first place.
“This analysis is based on a MySQL database dump of the RAMP forum’s XenForo installation. We parsed raw SQL to extract structured data from the xf_user (7,707 records), xf_thread (1,732 records), xf_post, xf_ip (340,333 records), xf_admin_log, xf_conversation_master (1,899 records), and xf_conversation_message (3,875 records) tables.” concludes the analysis. “IP addresses were decoded from binary format and geolocated against known ISP allocations. All findings are based on data as it existed in the database dump and have not been independently verified against live sources.”
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