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AutoSUT: The Environment Semantics Gap in Structured CTI ...
[Submitted on 7 Jun 2026 (v1), last revised 12 Jun 2026 (this ve · 2026-06-16 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) increasingly supports adversary emulation, detection evaluation, and cyber range design, yet each workflow still requires a target System Under Test (SUT) whose environment is not fully described by public CTI. We define the environment semantics gap as a measurable property of structured CTI: the SUT information required for replay-ready instantiation that cannot be derived solely from structured fields. We present AutoSUT, a pipeline that locates where corpus-supported narrowing ends and analyst specification begins. Across ATT&CK Enterprise, Mobile, and ICS STIX bundles, with CAPEC and FiGHT as contrast datasets, we measure platform coverage, software specificity, vulnerability evidence, and deployment compatibility. Platform tags are near-universal, but 97.6% of Enterprise software objects lack version indicators and CPE identifiers. Campaign-level CVE evidence covers only 9.6% of campaigns, even after free-text enrichment, and only 19 of 691 techniques (2.7%) are container-feasible under conservative backend-family assignment. Profile confusion among intrusion sets drops from 1.3% for one linked software item to 0% for two linked software items, indicating that software-evidence density, not CVE enrichment, drives actor-specific SUT screening. Finally, we constructively demonstrate environment non-uniqueness: holding every corpus-supported element fixed and varying only the analyst-authored region yields multiple distinct, campaign-compatible SUTs, including an executable witness running CVE-2021-41773 and coincident witnesses in which structurally different service realizations execute the same attack. Structured CTI, therefore, constrains but does not uniquely determine the executable environment. Replay-ready emulation should accordingly declare which environment commitments the corpus supports and which remain analyst-authored.

Submission history

From: Ágney Lopes Roth Ferraz [view email]
[v1] Sun, 7 Jun 2026 15:54:01 UTC (122 KB)
[v2] Fri, 12 Jun 2026 18:46:56 UTC (122 KB)