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Let's Encrypt

The difficulty of making sure your website is broken Simplifying Certificate Renewals for Millions of Domains with ACME Renewal Information (ARI) Six-Day and IP Address Certificates Available in Certbot Shorter Certificate Lifetimes and Rate Limits DNS-PERSIST-01: A New Model for DNS-based Challenge Validation On the Importance of "Hello" and "Thanks" 6-day and IP Address Certificates are Generally Available 10 Years of Let's Encrypt Certificates Decreasing Certificate Lifetimes to 45 Days New "Generation Y" Hierarchy of Root and Intermediate Certificates Ten Years of Community Support ACME Renewal Information (ARI) Published as RFC 9773 Native ACME Support Comes to NGINX End of Life Plan for RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency Logs OCSP Service Has Reached End of Life We've Issued Our First IP Address Certificate Expiration Notification Service Has Ended Reflections on a Year of Sunlight How We Reduced the Impact of Zombie Clients Sustaining a More Secure Internet: The Power of Recurring Donations Ending TLS Client Authentication Certificate Support in 2026 How Pebble Supports ACME Client Developers Ten Years of Let's Encrypt: Announcing support from Jeff Atwood We Issued Our First Six Day Cert Encryption for Everybody Scaling Our Rate Limits to Prepare for a Billion Active Certificates Ending Support for Expiration Notification Emails Announcing Six Day and IP Address Certificate Options in 2025 Announcing Certificate Profile Selection Ending OCSP Support in 2025 Intent to End OCSP Service More Memory Safety for Let’s Encrypt: Deploying ntpd-rs Let’s Encrypt Continues Partnership with Princeton to Bolster Internet Security Takeaways from Tailscale’s Adoption of ARI An Engineer’s Guide to Integrating ARI into Existing ACME Clients Deploying Let's Encrypt's New Issuance Chains New Intermediate Certificates Introducing Sunlight, a CT implementation built for scalability, ease of operation, and reduced cost A Year-End Letter from our Vice President Our role in supporting the nonprofit ecosystem Increase your security governance with CAA Shortening the Let's Encrypt Chain of Trust ISRG’s 10th Anniversary Improving Resiliency and Reliability for Let’s Encrypt with ARI Thank you to our 2023 renewing sponsors A Look into the Engineering Culture at ISRG Let’s Encrypt improves how we manage OCSP responses A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists Nurturing Continued Growth of Our Oak CT Log TLS Beyond the Web: How MongoDB Uses Let’s Encrypt for Database-to-Application Security Let’s Encrypt Receives the Levchin Prize for Real-World Cryptography New Major Funding from the Ford Foundation TLS Simply and Automatically for Europe’s Largest Cloud Customers Making the Web safer and more secure for everyone Resources for Certificate Chaining Help Speed at scale: Let’s Encrypt serving Shopify’s 4.5 million domains Preparing to Issue 200 Million Certificates in 24 Hours The Next Gen Database Servers Powering Let's Encrypt A Year-End Letter from the Executive Director of Let's Encrypt and ISRG Extending Android Device Compatibility for Let's Encrypt Certificates Standing on Our Own Two Feet [Updated] Let's Encrypt's New Root and Intermediate Certificates Let's Encrypt Has Issued a Billion Certificates Multi-Perspective Validation Improves Domain Validation Security How Let's Encrypt Runs CT Logs Introducing Oak, a Free and Open Certificate Transparency Log Transitioning to ISRG's Root The ACME Protocol is an IETF Standard Facebook Expands Support for Let’s Encrypt Looking Forward to 2019 Let's Encrypt Root Trusted By All Major Root Programs Engineering deep dive: Encoding of SCTs in certificates Looking Forward to 2018 ACME Support in Apache HTTP Server Project Wildcard Certificates Coming January 2018 Milestone: 100 Million Certificates Issued ACME v2 API Endpoint Coming January 2018 OVH Renews Platinum Sponsorship of Let's Encrypt Let’s Encrypt 2016 In Review Launching Our Crowdfunding Campaign Our First Grant: The Ford Foundation Squarespace OCSP Stapling Implementation Introducing Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) Support ISRG Legal Transparency Report, January 2016 - June 2016 What It Costs to Run Let's Encrypt Let's Encrypt Root to be Trusted by Mozilla Full Support for IPv6 Defending Our Brand [Updated] Progress Towards 100% HTTPS, June 2016 Leaving Beta, New Sponsors ISRG Legal Transparency Report, July 2015 - December 2015 New Name, New Home for the Let's Encrypt Client Software Our Millionth Certificate OVH Sponsors Let's Encrypt Entering Public Beta Facebook Sponsors Let's Encrypt Public Beta: December 3, 2015 Why ninety-day lifetimes for certificates? The CA's Role in Fighting Phishing and Malware Let's Encrypt is Trusted
Onboarding Your Customers with Let's Encrypt and ACME
2019-10-09 · via Let's Encrypt

By Jacob Hoffman-Andrews ·

If you work at a hosting provider or CDN, ACME’s DNS-01 validation method can make it a lot easier to onboard new customers who have an existing HTTPS website at another provider. Before your new customer points their domain name at your servers, you need to have a certificate already installed for them. Otherwise visitors to the customer’s site will see an outage for a few minutes while you issue and install a certificate. To fix this, you and your new customer should use the DNS-01 validation method to issue a certificate before the customer switches over DNS for their site.

How the DNS Validation Method Works

The DNS-01 validation method works like this: to prove that you control www.example.com, you create a TXT record at _acme-challenge.www.example.com with a “digest value” as specified by ACME (your ACME client should take care of creating this digest value for you). When the TXT record is ready, your ACME client informs the ACME server (for instance, Let’s Encrypt) that the domain is ready for validation. The ACME server looks up the TXT record, compares it to the expected digest value, and if the result is correct, considers your account authorized to issue for www.example.com. Your new customer can set up this TXT record (or a CNAME) without interfering with normal website operations.

The Advantages of a CNAME

There’s an additional trick that I recommend for hosting providers and CDNs: Instead of giving the digest value to your new customer and telling them to make a TXT record with it, tell your customer to configure a CNAME from _acme-challenge.www.example.com to a domain name that you control and that is unique to the domain being validated. For instance, you might use www.example.com.validationserver.example.net. Then, once your software has verified that this CNAME is set up (accounting for propagation delay and anycast), your ACME client should begin the validation process for www.example.com, provisioning a TXT record at www.example.com.validationserver.example.net. Because the ACME server’s TXT lookup follows CNAMEs (as do all DNS lookups), it will see the value you provisioned, and consider your account authorized.

This approach is preferable to handing your customers a raw digest value for a few reasons. First, it gives your customers all the time they need to set up the CNAME. If you create a pending authorization up front and give your customer a digest value to deploy themselves, it has a fixed lifetime before it expires (for Let’s Encrypt this lifetime is 7 days). If your customer doesn’t complete the process in that time, you’ll have to create a new pending authorization and give your customer a new digest value. That’s annoying and time consuming for both you and your customer. The CNAME method means even if it takes your new customer a month to make the needed changes to their DNS, you can get things up and running as soon as they do.

Another reason to prefer the CNAME method over having new customers directly provision their TXT records is to support the best practice of periodically rotating your ACME account key. Because the digest value used for DNS-01 validation is computed based on your current ACME account key, it will change whenever you rotate your account key. If you asked customers to provision their TXT record manually, that means notifying potential new customers that the value you asked them to put in DNS isn’t valid anymore, and they need to use a different one. That’s pretty inconvenient! If you use the CNAME method instead, there’s only one ACME-related value you’ll ever need to have your new customers put in DNS, and it won’t change as you change your account key.

Cleaning Up Unused CNAMES

One last note: This is a good way to onboard customers, but you also need to detect when customers offboard themselves. They may simply change their A records to point at a different CDN, without telling you that their plans have changed. You should monitor for this situation and stop attempting to issue certificates. If the customer has left behind a CNAMEd _acme-challenge subdomain that points at you, you should contact them and remind them to delete it. The CNAMEd subdomain represents a delegated authorization to issue certificates, and cleaning up that delegation improves both the customer’s security posture and your own. Similarly, if a customer sets up the CNAME and you issue a certificate on their behalf, but they never point their A records at your servers, you should not reissue new certificates indefinitely without further intervention from the customer.