惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

Jina AI
Jina AI
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
T
The Blog of Author Tim Ferriss
阮一峰的网络日志
阮一峰的网络日志
罗磊的独立博客
J
Java Code Geeks
博客园 - 聂微东
B
Blog
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
WordPress大学
WordPress大学
腾讯CDC
L
LangChain Blog
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
D
DataBreaches.Net
The GitHub Blog
The GitHub Blog
美团技术团队
博客园 - Franky
Google DeepMind News
Google DeepMind News
V
V2EX
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
月光博客
月光博客
The Cloudflare Blog

Let's Encrypt

The difficulty of making sure your website is broken Simplifying Certificate Renewals for Millions of Domains with ACME Renewal Information (ARI) Six-Day and IP Address Certificates Available in Certbot Shorter Certificate Lifetimes and Rate Limits DNS-PERSIST-01: A New Model for DNS-based Challenge Validation On the Importance of "Hello" and "Thanks" 6-day and IP Address Certificates are Generally Available 10 Years of Let's Encrypt Certificates Decreasing Certificate Lifetimes to 45 Days New "Generation Y" Hierarchy of Root and Intermediate Certificates Ten Years of Community Support ACME Renewal Information (ARI) Published as RFC 9773 Native ACME Support Comes to NGINX End of Life Plan for RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency Logs OCSP Service Has Reached End of Life We've Issued Our First IP Address Certificate Expiration Notification Service Has Ended Reflections on a Year of Sunlight How We Reduced the Impact of Zombie Clients Sustaining a More Secure Internet: The Power of Recurring Donations Ending TLS Client Authentication Certificate Support in 2026 How Pebble Supports ACME Client Developers Ten Years of Let's Encrypt: Announcing support from Jeff Atwood Encryption for Everybody Scaling Our Rate Limits to Prepare for a Billion Active Certificates Ending Support for Expiration Notification Emails Announcing Six Day and IP Address Certificate Options in 2025 Announcing Certificate Profile Selection Ending OCSP Support in 2025 Intent to End OCSP Service
We Issued Our First Six Day Cert
2025-02-20 · via Let's Encrypt

By Josh Aas ·

Earlier this year we announced our intention to introduce short-lived certificates with lifetimes of six days as an option for our subscribers. Yesterday we issued our first short-lived certificate. You can see the certificate at the bottom of our post, or here thanks to Certificate Transparency logs. We issued it to ourselves and then immediately revoked it so we can observe the certificate’s whole lifecycle. This is the first step towards making short-lived certificates available to all subscribers.

The next step is for us to make short-lived certificates available to a small set of our subscribers so we can make sure our systems scale as expected prior to general availability. We expect this next phase to begin during Q2 of this year.

We expect short-lived certificates to be generally available by the end of this year.

How To Get Six-Day Certificates

Once short-lived certificates are an option for you, you’ll need to use an ACME client that supports ACME certificate profiles and select the short-lived certificate profile (“shortlived”). The lego client recently added this functionality.

In the meantime, the best way to prepare to take advantage of short-lived certificates is to make sure your ACME client is reliably renewing certificates in an automated fashion. If that’s working well then there should be no costs to switching to short-lived certificates.

You’ll also want to be sure your ACME client is running frequently - both for the sake of renewing short-lived certificates and so as to take advantage of ACME Renewal Information (ARI). ARI allows Let’s Encrypt to notify your client if it should renew early for some reason. ARI checks should happen at least once per day, and short-lived certificates should be renewed every two to three days, so we recommend having your client run at least once per day.

Shorter Certificate Lifetimes Are Good for Security

When the private key associated with a certificate is compromised, the recommendation has always been to have the certificate revoked so that people will know not to use it. Unfortunately, certificate revocation doesn’t work very well. This means that certificates with compromised keys (or other issues) may continue to be used until they expire. The longer the lifetime of the certificate, the longer the potential for use of a problematic certificate.

The primary advantage of short-lived certificates is that they greatly reduce the potential compromise window because they expire relatively quickly. This reduces the need for certificate revocation, which has historically been unreliable. Our six-day certificates will not include OCSP or CRL URLs. Additionally, short-lived certificates practically require automation, and we believe that automating certificate issuance is important for security.

Questions

If you have questions or comments about our plans, feel free to let us know on our community forums.

We’d like to thank Open Technology Fund for supporting this work.

Our First 6-Day Certificate

PEM format:

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

openssl x509 -text output:

Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            03:b0:b0:15:c1:a4:e2:64:16:11:73:1a:71:1b:71:1d:e0:ef
        Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
        Issuer: C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=E6
        Validity
            Not Before: Feb 19 17:30:01 2025 GMT
            Not After : Feb 26 09:30:00 2025 GMT
        Subject:
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                Public-Key: (256 bit)
                pub:
                    04:28:48:8b:6d:d9:5d:5a:a1:c2:39:77:1a:ca:47:
                    c8:8b:7e:69:b4:2a:25:6f:3a:18:b0:28:1c:b3:bb:
                    69:0b:78:2e:c2:d0:17:5f:02:0b:70:74:80:9d:92:
                    e1:21:01:7a:24:85:72:ea:e8:33:59:66:09:a1:e5:
                    3e:1f:95:5c:19
                ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                NIST CURVE: P-256
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Digital Signature
            X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
                TLS Web Server Authentication
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:FALSE
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                93:27:46:98:03:A9:51:68:8E:98:D6:C4:42:48:DB:23:BF:58:94:D2
            Authority Information Access:
                OCSP - URI:http://e6.o.lencr.org
                CA Issuers - URI:http://e6.i.lencr.org/
            X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
                DNS:helloworld.letsencrypt.org
            X509v3 Certificate Policies:
                Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.1
            CT Precertificate SCTs:
                Signed Certificate Timestamp:
                    Version   : v1 (0x0)
                    Log ID    : CC:FB:0F:6A:85:71:09:65:FE:95:9B:53:CE:E9:B2:7C:
                                22:E9:85:5C:0D:97:8D:B6:A9:7E:54:C0:FE:4C:0D:B0
                    Timestamp : Feb 19 18:28:32.078 2025 GMT
                    Extensions: none
                    Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
                                30:45:02:20:53:5D:E7:54:DF:48:D8:89:AC:EF:B6:F7:
                                8B:78:F4:2E:40:35:CE:28:0B:B8:13:53:37:FB:C6:79:
                                4D:96:12:AC:02:21:00:C2:2E:61:7E:20:BD:4A:C2:8B:
                                C6:54:D0:D2:C7:2D:53:18:4B:99:D6:21:E3:4A:FA:10:
                                25:90:4B:FC:96:C3:60
                Signed Certificate Timestamp:
                    Version   : v1 (0x0)
                    Log ID    : E0:92:B3:FC:0C:1D:C8:E7:68:36:1F:DE:61:B9:96:4D:
                                0A:52:78:19:8A:72:D6:72:C4:B0:4D:A5:6D:6F:54:04
                    Timestamp : Feb 19 18:28:32.147 2025 GMT
                    Extensions: none
                    Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
                                30:46:02:21:00:AC:D8:DB:99:21:42:25:A0:E6:87:D6:
                                DF:5E:5C:32:9B:F1:B8:E8:58:44:81:3E:C2:B8:8B:60:
                                71:32:F1:08:B3:02:21:00:E3:0D:69:03:72:AF:56:24:
                                CE:B7:0D:53:3D:79:A8:65:74:A1:52:E0:E4:12:4D:FA:
                                29:16:C5:73:9D:71:11:C5
    Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
    Signature Value:
        30:65:02:30:30:0d:ab:2e:c6:d3:d0:08:c3:35:dc:77:b4:8d:
        97:bb:85:c2:10:be:c6:57:dd:ba:fa:75:3d:e1:03:1d:cf:c5:
        03:d2:b7:99:16:24:19:7b:8a:b7:33:5d:3a:1e:f0:70:02:31:
        00:b8:c4:30:39:81:42:2c:17:6c:1e:38:ee:81:a4:69:90:1e:
        d2:ba:b1:03:71:2d:35:5e:70:8f:4a:1b:78:e6:e5:ba:3f:cd:
        81:4b:15:10:6f:4e:aa:20:48:a2:08:05:47