Abstract:Machine learning-based malware detectors are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial examples. Traditional defenses, such as one-shot adversarial training, often fail against adaptive attackers who use reinforcement learning to bypass detection. This paper proposes a robust defense framework based on bilevel optimization, explicitly modeling the strategic interaction between a defender and an attacker as an adversarial co-evolutionary process. We evaluate our approach using the MAB-malware framework against three distinct malware families: Mokes, Strab, and DCRat. Our experimental results demonstrate that while standard classifiers and basic adversarial retraining often remain vulnerable, showing evasion rates as high as 90 %, the proposed bilevel optimization approach consistently achieves near-total immunity, reducing evasion rates to 0 - 1.89 %. Furthermore, the iterative framework significantly increases the attacker's query complexity, raising the average cost of successful evasion by up to two orders of magnitude. These findings suggest that modeling the iterative cycle of attack and defense through bilevel optimization is essential for developing resilient malware detection systems capable of withstanding evolving adversarial threats.
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2604.22569 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2604.22569v1 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.22569 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
From: Martin Jureček [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 24 Apr 2026 14:01:18 UTC (474 KB)
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