- Gateway HTTP: match models, session kill, and session history route paths without trusting malformed Host headers, avoiding pre-auth 500s on those endpoints.

- Google Meet/Codex: report malformed node proxy `payloadJSON` responses with plugin-owned errors instead of leaking raw JSON parser failures.

- Debug proxy: reject malformed relative-form proxy targets with a controlled 400 response instead of letting URL parsing escape the request handler.

- File transfer: reject malformed inline `file_write` base64 before computing hashes or invoking paired nodes, avoiding Node's lenient base64 decoder.

- Models config/auth: stop inferring provider env-var markers from broad `^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$` strings, and resolve config-backed provider `apiKey` values only through structured env SecretRefs (`secrets.providers[id]` / `secrets.defaults`), so unrelated env vars cannot accidentally become provider credentials. Thanks @sallyom.

- Media fetch: skip allocating and buffering the response body for bodyless media responses (HEAD probes and 204-style empty bodies), avoiding wasted heap on streams that carry no payload. Thanks @shakkernerd.

- CLI/onboarding: forward provider-specific auth flags (e.g. `--openai-api-key`) through the onboarding wizard so they reach provider auth methods via `ctx.opts`, letting `--openai-api-key "$OPENAI_API_KEY"` skip the redundant "use existing env var?" prompt in non-interactive harnesses. (#81669) Thanks @sjf.

import { callGatewayTool } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/agent-harness-runtime";

import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";

import { createFileWriteTool } from "./file-write-tool.js";

vi.mock("openclaw/plugin-sdk/agent-harness-runtime", () => ({

callGatewayTool: vi.fn(),

listNodes: vi.fn(),

resolveNodeIdFromList: vi.fn(),

}));

vi.mock("openclaw/plugin-sdk/media-store", () => ({

readMediaBuffer: vi.fn(),

}));

describe("file_write tool", () => {

it("rejects malformed inline base64 before invoking the node", async () => {

const tool = createFileWriteTool();

await expect(

tool.execute("tool-call-1", {

node: "node-1",

path: "/tmp/out.txt",

contentBase64: "AAA@@@",

}),

).rejects.toThrow("contentBase64 is not valid base64");

expect(callGatewayTool).not.toHaveBeenCalled();

});

});

FILE_WRITE_TOOL_DESCRIPTOR,

} from "./descriptors.js";

function normalizeBase64ForCompare(value: string): string {

return value.replace(/=+$/u, "").replace(/-/gu, "+").replace(/_/gu, "/");

}

function decodeStrictBase64(value: string): Buffer {

const buffer = Buffer.from(value, "base64");

if (normalizeBase64ForCompare(buffer.toString("base64")) !== normalizeBase64ForCompare(value)) {

throw new Error("contentBase64 is not valid base64");

}

return buffer;

}

async function readSourceBytes(input: {

contentBase64?: string;

sourceMediaId?: string;

if (input.contentBase64 === undefined) {

throw new Error("contentBase64 or sourceMediaId required");

}

const buffer = Buffer.from(input.contentBase64, "base64");

const buffer = decodeStrictBase64(input.contentBase64);

return { buffer, contentBase64: input.contentBase64, source: "inline" };

}