We localize the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models. An intermediate-layer attention gate reads detected content and triggers deeper amplifier heads that boost the signal toward refusal. In smaller models the gate and amplifier are single heads; at larger scale they become bands of heads across adjacent layers. The gate contributes under 1% of output DLA, yet interchange testing (p < 0.001) and knockout cascade confirm it is causally necessary. Interchange screening at n >= 120 detects the same motif in twelve models from six labs (2B to 72B), though specific heads differ by lab. Per-head ablation weakens up to 58x at 72B and misses gates that interchange identifies; at scale, interchange is the only reliable audit. Modulating the detection-layer signal continuously controls policy from hard refusal through evasion to factual answering. On safety prompts the same intervention turns refusal into harmful guidance, showing that the safety-trained capability is gated by routing, not removed. Thresholds vary by topic and by input language, and the circuit relocates across generations within a family even while behavioral benchmarks register no change. Routing is early-commitment: the gate fires at its own layer before deeper layers finish processing the input. An in-context substitution cipher collapses gate interchange necessity by 70 to 99% across three models, and the model switches to puzzle-solving rather than refusal. Injecting the plaintext gate activation into the cipher forward pass restores 48% of refusals in Phi-4-mini, localizing the bypass to the routing interface. A second method, cipher contrast analysis, uses plain/cipher DLA differences to map the full cipher-sensitive routing circuit in O(3n) forward passes. Any encoding that defeats detection-layer pattern matching bypasses the policy regardless of whether deeper layers reconstruct the content.