Self-evolving agents improve by repeatedly proposing changes to their own prompts, skills, or workflows and keeping those that score higher on a small held-out set. Almost all effort has gone into the proposer that generates candidates; we argue the weak point is the acceptor, the rule that decides whether to commit a change. Applied hundreds of times against the same noisy dev estimate, the ubiquitous "keep it if the score went up" rule is uncontrolled adaptive multiple testing: the agent effectively p-hacks itself, accumulating false commits that make it churn and drift rather than improve. We recast committing as a sequential hypothesis test and propose PACE (Paired Anytime-valid Commit Evaluation), a training-free, anytime-valid commit gate. Each candidate is compared to the incumbent on identical instances and committed only when a testing-by-betting e-process accumulates decisive evidence, stopping early to save evaluations and controlling each candidate's false-commit probability at a user-set level even under optional stopping (a per-decision guarantee). On Qwen2.5 agents (0.5B-3B) self-evolving at the prompt level on GSM8K, SVAMP, and ARC-Challenge, greedy acceptance commits 30-42% false and 10-33% harmful edits when a genuine improvement is hidden among noisy proposals, while PACE commits the real one and essentially nothing else, matching greedy's held-out accuracy at sharply lower variance and about 18% lower evaluation cost. With no real gain available, greedy commits 13-21 spurious self-modifications per run (72-100% false) and degrades the most fragile agent by 4.9 points, while PACE holds at baseline. Reliability of self-evolution depends on the acceptor, not only on the proposer.