Amit Baruah: So, Kumar, who’s winning and who’s losing?

Ramanathan Kumar: Now, that’s a tough one

Amit Baruah: I think that’s the question uppermost in the minds of our viewers.

Ramanathan Kumar: My answer would be that for Iran to win, it doesn’t have to lose. They just have to hang in there—that itself constitutes a victory, which is exactly what they have done till now. As you rightly said, they have shown an enormous amount of resilience, perhaps surprising the Americans and Israelis who, by all accounts, began this war on a false surmise that Iran would capitulate easily.

There was the 12-day war last time, which ended very quickly on American terms. And then, of course, there were the events in Venezuela, which possibly gave President Trump the impression that Iran, too, would be a cakewalk. But clearly, that has not been the case. Although the American president seems to feel that, because one set of leaders has been eliminated, regime change has taken place, but not many would agree with such a simplistic definition.

Amit Baruah: Well, if it’s not regime change, the army chief in the United States has been fired.

Ramanathan Kumar: That could be called a regime change of sorts. But be that as it may, there was possibly also an intelligence miscalculation. My understanding is that a somewhat rosy picture was painted by Israeli intelligence, which possibly sold the Israeli prime minister on the idea that decapitation strikes would lead to a collapse of the regime.

Amit Baruah: But clearly, carrying out decapitation strikes against the regime seems, if anything, to have strengthened it, with more popular support on the streets of Iran.

Ramanathan Kumar: Absolutely. It is one thing to carry out decapitation strikes against terrorist organisations that may not have deep bench strength. But carrying out such strikes against a well-entrenched regime that, as you said, commands a certain measure of public support—even if not from the entire population—is a different matter altogether. If you kill one set of leaders, another takes over. Get rid of them, and yet another emerges. With each stage, the leadership that takes over is perhaps even harder-line than the previous one. This represents the utter failure of the calculation that decapitation strikes would lead to a collapse of the regime.

There has also been an inability to achieve the goal of eliminating Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. The entire stockpile of highly enriched uranium—970 pounds or so, at 60 per cent, just short of bomb-grade—which had been, quote-unquote, obliterated during the 12-day war of June last year, is still sitting underground in Isfahan and Natanz, if the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency is to be believed. None of these calculations has panned out.

Amit Baruah: What’s your sense? We are also seeing Iran hitting American bases across the region—in Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE. As a long-time intelligence analyst, are you surprised by these capabilities?

Ramanathan Kumar: I would say yes—Iran has performed better than someone like me expected. But those who started this war and are the real experts should have known better. If they are surprised, then they were clearly delusional. Absolutely. That would be a rather damning commentary on the analytical capabilities of the much-vaunted intelligence agencies of the US and Israel combined.

Amit Baruah: Even in India, there is great admiration for the Israelis. We are also seeing Hezbollah hitting Israeli forces hard in Lebanon, and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has scaled back its stated objectives of occupying more territory there. Do intelligence agencies sometimes oversell capabilities?

Ramanathan Kumar: I think there are two things at play. Agencies like the Mossad are famous for their acts of derring-do—or Dhurandhar-style operations, to use a more desi expression. But these are certainly not the be-all and end-all of intelligence. Those who have really done this job know that the real, hard task is accurately anticipating what your adversary is capable of doing.

Shaping events is yet another function of intelligence, but the core mission is to anticipate correctly—that is, the analytical function. And clearly, in this case as in many others, the Americans have got things wrong, for some fundamental reasons. The greatest occupational hazard in intelligence is the tendency of intelligence bosses not to speak truth to power, but to produce intelligence to please. If you know what your political boss wants to hear—

Amit Baruah: You can tailor the intelligence to fit the requirement.

Ramanathan Kumar: Indeed. Just as journalists can tailor their stories to their readers and their bosses. Consider 2003, when the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]—to use the famous phrase of CIA director George Tenet—declared it a “slam dunk” that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence had been massaged because that is what the Bush administration wanted to hear.

Amit Baruah: “Massage” may be a kind word, given that nothing was actually found.

Ramanathan Kumar: I’m using the media’s own expression. But something similar seems to have happened this time. Knowing Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing desire to reshape the Middle East—an enormously ambitious project—the Mossad appears to have told him that the regime would capitulate quickly. Netanyahu, in turn, appears to have sold that story to the American president, who then believed he could achieve what no other American president in history had managed.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with US President Donald Trump at the Knesset in October 2025, in Jerusalem. Five weeks into the Iran-Israel-US conflict, missile strikes continue across the region, with disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz raising concerns over global energy supply and shipping routes. | Photo Credit: Reuters

Amit Baruah: The literal destruction of Iran.

Ramanathan Kumar: Absolutely. That is the other dimension of producing intelligence to please political masters. And one final point on this subject: all the tactical and operational brilliance of intelligence agencies—the Mossad’s feat of blowing up Hezbollah operatives’ pagers, eliminating Hamas leaders in Tehran, and this time apparently penetrating Iran’s cyber infrastructure thoroughly, including, I believe, even Tehran’s traffic signal system, which is how they were reportedly able to pinpoint the exact locations of key targets—all of this tactical brilliance is of no use if it is not paired with political wisdom and strategic sagacity. That is what is clearly missing here. Due to the absence of clearly defined strategic objectives, the Americans and Israelis now find themselves potentially caught in a quagmire, constantly shifting their goals.

Amit Baruah: On the question of strategic objectives—I sense that the Israeli objective, at least, was to reduce Iran to a situation similar to Syria, Libya, or Iraq: to degrade the state and render it semi-functional or non-functional on occasion. You will recall that after handing Syria over to an al-Qaeda-affiliated leader of their choice, the Israelis bombed Syrian military capabilities relentlessly for several days. My own sense is that they wanted to do the same with Iran, but that strategic objective now appears to have been badly miscalculated.

Ramanathan Kumar: I would agree. Iran has tremendous resilience—the regime has deep roots. And the more you speak of bombing them back into the Stone Age, forgetting that the Persian civilisation existed for many centuries before the United States was even conceived, forgetting that you are inflicting so much suffering on the people—hitting school children, hospitals, universities, sites of historical importance—even those who might have wished to rise against what is arguably an unpopular regime would think twice. Rather than rising against it, they may well rally around the flag. The longer this goes on, the more likely it is that a groundswell of nationalist fervour builds in Iran. That would be an epic miscalculation.

Amit Baruah: Whatever else happens in West Asia, do you think the security arrangements at American bases in the region—in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE—are going to be fundamentally reordered?

Ramanathan Kumar: That will be a tough call for the Gulf states and for the US. When the dust settles, will these Gulf states try to reach some kind of accommodation with Iran? Will they loosen their ties with America? These are very difficult questions. But I would agree with those who feel this will fundamentally affect America’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific. It’s possible the Americans will remain embroiled in the Middle East for a long time to come.

Amit Baruah: Looking at the situation as it stands, the Iranians do not appear to be interested in negotiations—and perhaps with good reason. Many believe that precisely because the negotiations were making progress, the attacks came. They don’t seem to be in a mood to negotiate an end to the war. How do you read that?

Ramanathan Kumar: Clearly, they feel they are winning. Time is on their side, and so they can afford to let this drag on. As someone has written, the keys to the world’s energy security have effectively been handed to them. They are negotiating from a position of strength. Whatever the Americans say about having hit 11,000 or 12,000 targets and degraded Iran’s missile-launching capabilities, hidden reserves continue to emerge with each passing day—from caves, tunnels, wherever.

Five weeks on, Iran feels it has survived. It has taken a frightful pounding, but it is still standing. And this is a country with a deep tradition of venerating martyrdom and suffering. They are absorbing the pain. They know the Strait of Hormuz cannot be reopened without their consent. So eventually, if you ask me how this ends, bombing Iran into the Stone Age is not an option—it won’t get anyone anywhere. There will have to be a negotiated settlement.

Iran will have a prominent seat at that table. Many of the maximalist American demands will have to be scaled back. There could be some kind of international coalition guaranteeing the safety of the Strait of Hormuz and a mutual non-attack agreement. You cannot negotiate in good faith while simultaneously bombing the country you are negotiating with. So a negotiated settlement is inevitable, but at the end of it all, the theocratic regime will continue in Iran. What happens much further down the line is a different matter.

Amit Baruah: On the subject of negotiations, our western neighbour Pakistan appears to have played a significant role, at least in the public domain, in passing messages—playing the postman, so to speak. Yet the Iranians do not seem to have been receptive. Iranian analysts have even suggested that their leaders would have been exposed to various risks had they travelled to Pakistan. And we have also seen that Pakistan is being asked to repay the rollover cash it received from the UAE—some $3.5 billion.

Is this a negotiating card Pakistan is playing? It also has a defence agreement with Saudi Arabia, which Riyadh would be very happy to invoke. What’s your sense?

Ramanathan Kumar: I think Pakistan does feel emboldened. It believes it occupies some kind of geopolitical sweet spot. And clearly the field marshal has the ear of the White House—for all kinds of questionable reasons, one might say: a Nobel Prize nomination, a dubious cryptocurrency deal, an equally dubious minerals arrangement, and a shady hotel transaction.

Amit Baruah: But Pakistan’s closeness to the Americans may also make the Iranians suspicious.

Ramanathan Kumar: Indeed.

Amit Baruah: So playing the go-between is a difficult game—and there can be casualties.

Ramanathan Kumar: Absolutely. Though Pakistan has a long track record of trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, they are playing true to form. There are many inconsistencies and contradictions they have to juggle. On the other hand, they have aligned with China, and together they released a five-point peace proposal that would be far more palatable to the Iranians than the American 15-point charter of demands.

Amit Baruah: Well, any effort at bringing peace or enabling negotiations at this time would be welcome. People queuing for LPG cylinders or fuel the world over would be happy to see an end to this conflict. On that note, how do you think India has played it? After the Prime Minister made a sudden visit to Israel and met closely with Netanyahu, bombing began just a couple of days later. We then saw the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister working the phones with the Iranian leadership to secure passage for Indian tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. How would you assess India’s handling of the situation so far?

Ramanathan Kumar: I think something is different now, as many have pointed out. In the past, India’s non-aligned position was not always truly non-aligned. We were quick to criticise Western countries over Suez, but when Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary in the 1950s, we stayed silent. We did not criticise the Soviets for walking into Afghanistan in the late 1970s, either.

A map showing the Strait of Hormuz, also known as Madiq Hurmuz. With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz under pressure and reports of alternative payment demands, the conflict has triggered renewed focus on oil prices, supply chains, and the security of key chokepoints. | Photo Credit: Reuters

Amit Baruah: Though there is some evidence that Mrs Gandhi privately spoke to Brezhnev.

Ramanathan Kumar: Indeed, and when he asked what the way out was, she said it was the same as the way in.

Amit Baruah: We do have that information. But it seems unlikely that Prime Minister Modi would have privately told Mr. Netanyahu that bombing Iran was not a good idea.

Ramanathan Kumar: I no longer have access to privileged information, so I cannot say. But the point I was trying to make is that in the past, when India took positions—more often than not clearly articulated—those positions were based on a determination of India’s long-term national interest. And when it came to fundamental national interests, there used to be a bipartisan political consensus.

Amit Baruah: On the question of national interest—it was in India’s interest to keep buying oil from Russia, and it remains in India’s interest to buy oil from Iran. Today, Trump has, in his largesse, indicated that India may buy Russian and Iranian oil. Tomorrow, he may withdraw that consent. So the litmus test is: will our government continue to buy oil from Russia and Iran?

Ramanathan Kumar: I would agree, and this is precisely what I was getting at. It was that national consensus that allowed us to stand up for our national interest without being pushed around by any country, however powerful. And that is what seems to be eroding now.

Amit Baruah: The weakness of the opposition parties in India probably allows the government to do whatever it wants.

Ramanathan Kumar: One is not blaming any one side, but the question is whether we are capable of standing up for our interests.

Amit Baruah: So you think it would be in our national interest to keep buying oil from Russia and Iran, whatever the outcome of this conflict?

Ramanathan Kumar: It has always been in our national interest to do so, and we should be in a position to continue doing so. We speak much of strategic autonomy—a phrase that is much bandied about. Our ability to manage our own energy security in whatever manner we deem best is an integral part of that strategic autonomy.

Amit Baruah: No one should be able to dictate to us where we buy from. It’s our business.

Ramanathan Kumar: Indeed. There’s no question of a 30-day window or any such grace period—we buy what we want from wherever we want. Consider China: it has been the single largest buyer of Iranian oil because it suits its interests, and American sanctions have made not a dime’s worth of difference to them.

Amit Baruah: And Trump is reportedly very keen to visit China despite all that.

Ramanathan Kumar: He will be there in May.

Amit Baruah: So, essentially, you have to stand up to a bully.

Ramanathan Kumar: Indeed, and you must have the capability to do so—as China has demonstrated. It has been able to turn the screws on the critical minerals that all high-tech industries in the world, and particularly in America, depend on. You must have leverage.

Amit Baruah: And the Iranians, too, have shown they can impose their own kind of sanctions by controlling the Strait of Hormuz.

Ramanathan Kumar: Absolutely. If two countries have demonstrated the ability to withstand all kinds of unreasonable and unhealthy pressure, they are China and Iran. In some ways, when it comes to standing up for our legitimate national interests, we could take a leaf from the book of both.

Amit Baruah: These are not easy issues to navigate, but you have shed light on a range of important questions. I do hope that sense prevails, and that the strategic autonomy you spoke of becomes a genuine practice for the government—not merely a mantra—because the people of India cannot afford the kind of energy prices the world is likely to see over the next six months to a year.